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What important engagements and actions did the middle Tennessee region see during the Civil War in November 1864?
The Official Records list the following actions by the day of the month for November 1864. Each action has an entry in the Official Records detailing what happened.
1-30 Tennessee/transfer of the First and Third Divisions, Sixteenth Army Corps, from Missouri to
1 Union Station/skirmishes
2-3 Davidson’s Ferry, Tennessee River/attack on gunboats
4-17 Breckinridge’s/advance
4-5 Johnsonville/action
4 Tawah, U.S.S., U.S.S. Key West, and U.S.S. Elfin/destruction
5-6 Big Pigeon River/skirmishes
9-13 Moscow/expedition to
10 Memphis/scout near
11-13 Bull’s Gap/action
11 Russellville/skirmish
14-Jan. 23, 1865 Tennessee, Middle/campaign in
14 Russellville/action near
15 Collierville/skirmish near
16-17 Strawberry Plains/skirmishes
17 FlatCreek/skirmish
22 Lawrenceburg/action
23 Fouche Springs/skirmish
23 Henryville/skirmish
23 Mount Pleasant/action
24-27 Columbia/skirmishes in front
24 Campbellsville/action
24 Lynnville/skirmish
28 Duck River/skirmishes at crossings
28 Shelbyville/skirmish
29 Columbia Ford/action
29 Mount Carmel/skirmish
29 Rally Hill/skirmish near
29 Spring Hill/engagement
29 Thompson’s Station/affair
30 Thompson’s Station/skirmish
30 Franklin/battle
Source: A Guide-Index to the Official Records Of The Union And Confederate Armies, 1861-1865. Volume IV, Main Western Theater Ops. except Gulf Approach (1861-63). Section N–Checklist by State/Date–TENNESSEE.
The Civil War Preservation Trust (CWPT) publishes an annual report [download 9.5mb]of the ten most endangered Civil War battlefields. Spring Hill (TN) made the list again for 2009.
The action that took place at Spring Hill between the Confederate and Union forces on 29 November 1864 set the stage for the Battle of Franklin on 30 November 1864. It is important to preserve the battlefield at Spring Hill since it is part of the larger story of Hood’s late 1864 campaign in middle Tennessee.
As most rural areas are experiencing significant development in residential and commercial real estate, Spring Hill is no exception.
GM owns roughly 500 acres adjacent to the Rippavilla Plantation. The auto-giant is seeking to sell the property. GM is apparently stipulating that the development company interested in buying the property donate about 100 acres closest to Rippavilla. The entire transaction is unsettled as of April 2009.
See our Rippavilla Flickr folder of pictures.
Dr. Chris Losson, an author and teacher, provides a brief overview of the action from Spring Hill to Franklin in late November 1864.
This is an excerpt from a lecture Dr. Losson gave at the June 2008 Franklin’s Charge symposium in Franklin, TN. Listen why.
Video credit: 2008 Franklin’s Charge symposium
According to historian Eric Jacobson, the Army of Tennessee had 28,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry when it arrived in middle Tennessee in late 1864. Hood took over the Army of Tennessee in July from Johnston. There were 8,000 Federals garrisoned at Nashville at the time.
Hood would lose at least 7,500 at Franklin (30 Nov 1864) and another 6,600 at Nashville, two weeks later. When the Army of Tennessee retreated back to Pulaski in mid December 1864, the army was reduced to but a shadow of its former self.
Confederate General, John Bell Hood
Hood was the fifth commander of the Army of Tennessee. He commanded the army from July 17, 1864, until January 15, 1865. Many historians say his recklessness destroyed the Army of Tennessee. In just six months (July 1864 – December 1864) Hood lost at least 30,000 men* at a time when the Confederate army, and especially the Army of Tennessee, was in desperate need of men.
*Casualty estimates are based on the conservative figures as reported by the National Park Service. Here are the major engagements Hood was involved in from the time he became commander of the Army of Tennessee.
July 20 Peachtree Creek – 4,796
July 22 Atlanta – 8,499
July 28 Ezra Church – 3,000
Aug 31 – Sept 1 Jonesborough – 2,000
Nov 30 Franklin – 6,261
Dec 15 Nashville – 4,462
Major-General Stanley (right), commanding the Fourth Federal corps, in his official report stated that:
“In view of the strong position we held, nothing appeared so improbable as that they would assault. I felt so confident in this belief that I did not leave General Schofield’s headquarters until the firing commenced.”
Major-General Cox, (bottom right) commanding the Twenty-third corps, and in active command of the Federal line of battle, undertakes to account for the attack made by General Hood thus:
“
His exasperation at what he regarded as a hair’s breadth escape on our part from the toils in which he thought he had encompassed us at Spring Hill had probably clouded his judgment. He blamed some of his subordinates for the hesitation which he seems himself to have been responsible for, and now, in an excitement which led him astray, he determined to risk everything upon a desperate assault.”
The same eminent author, referring to the assault made by Cleburne and Brown on the Federal center, says:
“They were seen coming in splendid array. The sight was one to send a thrill through the heart, and those who saw it have never forgotten its martial magnificence.”
Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
Also read:
- Wikipedia article on Jacob D. Cox
Maj.-Gen. B. F. Cheatham.
“On the morning of the 4th of December,” says General Cheatham, “I went to the headquarters of Gen
eral Hood, and referring to his note and the criticism that had evidently been made by some one, I said to him, ‘A great opportunity was lost at Spring Hill, but you know that I obeyed your orders there, as everywhere, literally and promptly.’ General Hood not only did not dissent from what I said, but exhibited the most cordial manner, coupled with confidence and friendship.”
At daylight Cheatham’s corps passed through the village of Spring Hill, and between 1 and 2 o’clock p.m. the army reached the vicinity of Franklin, and Stewart’s and Cheatham’s corps were put in positions. The enemy was heavily intrenched and was superior in numbers and equipment. On the morning of the battle, General Schofield, commanding the Federal army, had behind his works 23,734 infantry and artillery, and his cavalry numbered 5,500. Maj.-Gen. J. D. Cox, U. S. A., upon whose authority these figures are given, states in his history of the battle of Franklin that Hood delivered the assault on the Federal lines with “two or three hundred less than 24,000″ men, and gives Forrest’s strength at 9,000. Maj.-Gen. John C. Brown reported that on the morning of November 29, 1864, he had not exceeding 2,750 men in his division, the largest in Cheatham’s corps, and the three divisions did not exceed 6,000. Smith’s brigade of Cleburne’s division was not present. Stewart’s corps after Allatoona was less than 7,000, and with Johnson’s division of Lee’s corps, the assaulting column did not exceed 16,000 men. General Forrest stated in his official report that the entire cavalry force under his command was about 5,000.
Bate’s division was on the left, Brown’s in the center, Cleburne’s on the right. General Bate says his line “charged the works of the enemy. 
My right got to the works (the second line) and remained there until morning;’the left was driven back. The enemy’s works were strong and defiant, constructed on a slight elevation, with few obstructions in front for several hundred yards. The works to the left of Carter’s creek turnpike were not strong, and with a vigorous assault should have been carried; a fact, however, not known until next day.” Bate’s division sustained a loss of 47 killed and 253 wounded. Capt. Todd Carter (right), on staff duty with Smith’s Tennessee brigade, fell mortally wounded near the enemy’s works and almost at the door of his father’s house.
No more magnificent spectacle was ever witnessed than the advance of the two divisions commanded by Cleburne and Brown; no two divisions of the army were ever led with greater skill and gallantry; no generals of division were ever supported with better ability by brigade, regimental and company officers. The troops were veterans who had never failed to respond to orders, although discouraged by recent and frequent disasters; and fully alive to the desperation of the assault about to be made, they advanced with noble courage. Before troops of equal numbers in the open field they would have been irresistible, but to attack intrenched troops, superior in numbers, advancing over an open plain without cover, was a disregard of the rules of war, a waste of precious lives, and a wrecking of an army once the pride and hope of the Southwest.
Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
General Forrest reported that after the arrival of Cleburne’s division at Spring Hill,
“I ordered Brig.-Gen. W. H. Jackson to move with his division in the direction of Thompson’s Station and there intercept the enemy. He struck the road at Fitzgerald’s, four miles from Spring Hill, at 11 o’clock, just as the front of the enemy’s column had passed. This attack was a complete surprise, producing much panic and confusion. Brigadier-General Jackson had possession of the pike and fought the enemy until daylight, but receiving no support he was compelled to retire.”
Two small brigades, commanded by Brigadier-Generals Armstrong and Ross, constituted Jackson’s division. If an adequate force had been sent forward to take advantage of the panic and confusion created by Jackson’s attack, a second golden opportunity would not have been lost.
Major-General Bate, referring to an interview with General Hood between the hours of 10 and 12 of the night of the 29th of November, at which General Bate mentioned a conflict in the orders of the general commanding and the corps commander touching the movement of his division, relates that General Hood said:
“It makes no difference now, or it is all right, anyhow, for General Forrest, as you see, has just left and informed me that he holds the turnpike with a portion of his forces north of Spring Hill, and will stop the enemy if he tries to pass toward Franklin, and so in the morning we will have a surrender without a fight.”
He further said in a congratulatory manner, “We can sleep quietly to-night.”
Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
Memphis, Tenn.,
May 20, 1877.
Maj.-Gen. John C. Brown, commanding Cheatham’s division, gave the following account of the same affair:
My division comprised four brigades of infantry, commanded respectively by Gen. S. R. Gist, of South Carolina, Gens. O. F. Strahl, O. W. Gordon and John C. Carter, of Tennessee. The whole command on the morning of November 29, 1864, when I left my bivouac on the Mooresville turnpike in front of Columbia, Tenn., numbered not exceeding 2,750 effective men. Gist’s brigade was the largest and Strahl’s was next in numerical strength, those of Gordon and Carter being about equal in the number of effective men. We started on the march about sunrise, and after traversing cedar brakes and pathless woods, crossed Duck river by a pontoon previously laid, about four miles above Columbia, at or near what was known as Davis’ ferry or Davis’ ford. Conforming to the daily alternations, my division was the rear of your (Cheatham’s) corps. After crossing Duck river, as I now recollect, at or near Bear creek, the commanding general, apprehending an attack on our left flank, ordered your corps, in its march from that point, to move in two parallel columns, so that it could come instantly into action in two lines of battle if attacked on the flank. Accordingly, my division was ordered to form the supporting column, and for that purpose to leave the road by which the main body was moving, and so conform its movements to that of the other two divisions (Cleburne’s and Bate’s), that in coming into action to meet an attack on our left flank, it would occupy a place in rear of and about 400 yards distant from the front line of battle. The march thence to Rutherford’s creek was made pursuant to these orders, and the whole distance thus traversed (five or six miles) was through fields and woods and over rough ground, adding greatly to the fatigues of the day. About the commencement of this movement, or soon afterward, by the orders of the commanding general in person, the whole of Gist’s and about one-half of Strahl’s brigade were detached for picket duty, to be relieved by the orders of the commanding general, thus leaving me with about one-half of my division.
When near Rutherford’s creek, learning that a crossing was not practicable east of the road, I changed the direction of the march to the left into the road and found Bate’s division preparing to cross the stream. After reaching the north bank of the stream, I was ordered to pursue the road leading in the direction of the Caldwell place, while Cleburne’s and Bate’s divisions moved at an angle to the left; but before reaching the Dr. Caldwell house, I was ordered to change the direction of my column to the left, and we reached the “Lewisburg,” or “Rally Hill” pike, near the toll-gate, a distance of one and a half mile from Spring Hill. This was within an hour or an hour and a half of sunset. I could distinctly see the enemy in force, both infantry and artillery, at Spring Hill, but did not, and perhaps could not at that point, see either troops or wagons, moving on the Columbia pike. Forrest’s cavalry were on higher ground northeast of my position. I was ordered to form line of battle and “take” Spring Hill. Gist’s brigade and the detachment from Strahl had not reported. I formed my line as speedily as worn troops could move, and after throwing forward a skirmish line, advanced 400 or 500 yards, when I discovered a line of the enemy thrown out of Spring Hill, across and threatening my right flank, and I then discovered for the first time that General Forrest’s cavalry, which I had been assured would protect my right, had been ordered to another part of the field, leaving me without any protection on my right flank or support in rear. I had neither artillery nor cavalry, and was left in a position where I must meet with inevitable disaster if I advanced on Spring Hill. A hasty consultation with my brigade commanders resulted in a determination to suspend the advance and confer with the corps commander. I need not remind you that in a very few minutes you were upon the field and fully approved of what had been done, as did also General Hood a little later, when he directed that the attack should be delayed until the arrival of Generals Stewart and Gist, and in the meanwhile, that the whole command should be held under orders to advance at a moment’s notice. General Gist’s brigade reported a little after nightfall and was immediately placed in position on my right. General Stewart’s corps came up later and went into bivouac on the stream in rear of my right, where it remained until the following morning. I received no further orders that evening or during the night to advance or change my position. After daylight on the morning of the 30th I took up the line of march for Franklin, the enemy in the meantime having preceded us under circumstances of which you are fully advised.
On the march to Franklin, General Cleburne, with whom I had long enjoyed very close personal relations, sent a message to the head of my column requesting an interview. Allowing my column to pass on, I awaited his arrival. When he came up we rode apart from the column through the fields, and he told me with much feeling that he had heard that the commanding general was endeavoring to place upon him the responsibility of allowing the enemy to pass our position on the night previous. I replied to him that I had heard nothing on that subject and that I hoped he was mistaken. He said, “No, I think not; my information comes through a very reliable channel,” and said that he could not afford to rest under such an imputation, and should certainly have the matter investigated to the fullest extent, as soon as we were away from the immediate presence of the enemy. General Cleburne was quite angry and evidently was deeply hurt, under the conviction that the com-mander-in-chief had censured him. I asked General Cleburne who was responsible for the escape of the enemy during the afternoon and night previous. In reply to that inquiry he indulged in some criticisms of a command (Bate’s division) occupying a position on his left, and concluded by saying that of course the responsibility rests with the commander-in-chief, as he was upon the field during the afternoon and was fully advised during the night of the movement of the enemy. The conversation at this point was abruptly terminated by the arrival of orders from yourself or the commanding general. As he left he said, “We will resume this conversation at the first convenient moment,” but in less than three hours after that time this gallant soldier was a corpse upon the bloody field of Franklin.
Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
Also see:
- Wikipedia article on John C. Brown
Major-General Cheatham gave the following account of the affair at Spring Hill:
In pursuance of orders from army headquarters, my command crossed Duck river on the morning of the 29th of November, 1864, the division of Major-General Cleburne in advance, followed by that of Major-General Bate, the division of Major-General Brown in the rear. The march was made as rapidly as the condition of the road would allow and without occurrence of note, until about 3 o’clock p.m., when I arrived at Rutherford’s creek, two and one-half miles from Spring Hill. At this point General Hood gave me verbal orders as follows: That I should get Cleburne across the creek and send him forward toward Spring Hill, with instructions to communicate with General Forrest, who was near the village, ascertain from him the position of the enemy, and attack immediately; that I should remain at the creek, assist General Bate in crossing his division, and then go forward and put Bate’s command in to support Cleburne, and that he would push Brown forward to join me.
As soon as the division of General Bate had crossed the creek I rode forward, and at a point on the road, about one and a half mile from Spring Hill, I saw the left of Cleburne’s command just disappearing over the hill to the left of the road. Halting there, I waited a few minutes for the arrival of Bate, and formed his command with his right upon the position of Cleburne’s left, and ordered him forward to the support of Cleburne. Shortly after Bate’s division had disappeared over the same range of hills, I heard firing toward Cleburne’s right and just then General Brown’s division had come up. I thereupon ordered Brown to proceed to the right, turn the range of hills over which Cleburne and Bate had crossed, and form line of battle and attack to the right of Cleburne. The division of General Brown was in motion to execute this order when I received a message from Cleburne that his right brigade had been struck in flank by the enemy and had suffered severely, and that he had been compelled to fall back and reform his division with a change of front.
It so happened that the direction of Cleburne’s advance was such as had exposed his right flank to the enemy’s line. 
When his command was formed on the road by which he had marched from Rutherford’s creek, neither the village of Spring Hill nor the turnpike could be seen. Instead of advancing directly upon Spring Hill, his forward movement was a little south of west and almost parallel with the turnpike toward Columbia, instead of northwest upon the enemy’s lines, south and east of the village. A reference to the map will show Cleburne’s line of advance. General Cleburne was killed in the assault upon Franklin the next day, and I had no opportunity to learn from him how it was that the error of direction occurred.
Meanwhile General Bate, whom I had placed in position on the left of Cleburne’s line of march, continued to move forward in the same direction until he had reached the farm of N. F. Cheairs, one and a half mile south of Spring Hill.
After Brown had reached the position indicated to him and had formed a line of battle, he sent to inform me that it would be certain disaster for him to attack, as the enemy’s line extended beyond his right several hundred yards. I sent word to him to throw back his right brigade and make the attack. I had already sent couriers after General Bate to bring him back and direct him to join Cleburne’s left. Going to the right of my line I found Generals Brown and Cleburne, and the latter reported that he had reformed his division. I then gave orders to Brown and Cleburne that as soon as they could connect their lines they should attack the enemy, who were then in sight; informing them at the same time that General Hood had just told me that Stewart’s column was close at hand, and that General Stewart had been ordered to go to my right and place his command across the pike. I furthermore said to them that I would go myself and see that General Bate was placed in position to connect with them, and immediately rode to the left of my line for that purpose.
During all this time I had met and talked with General Hood repeatedly, our field headquarters being not over 100 yards apart. After Cleburne’s repulse I had been along my line and had seen that Brown’s right was outflanked several hundred yards. I had urged General Hood to hurry up Stewart and place him on my right, and had received from him the assurance that this would be done; and this assurance, as before stated, I had communicated to Generals Cleburne and Brown.
When I returned from my left, where I had been to get Bate in position, and was on the way to the right of my line, it was dark; but I intended to move forward with Cleburne and Brown and make the attack, knowing that Bate would be in position to support them. Stewart’s column had already passed by on the way toward the turnpike, and I presumed he would be in position on my right.
On reaching the road where General Hood’s field quarters had been established, I found a courier with a message from General Hood requesting me to come to him at Captain Thompson’s house, about one and a fourth miles back on the road to Rutherford’s creek. I found General Stewart and General Hood. The commanding general there informed me that he had concluded to wait till morning, and directed me to hold my command in readiness to attack at daylight.
I was never more astonished than when General Hood informed me that he had concluded to postpone the attack till daylight. The road was still open–orders to remain quiet until morning–and nothing to prevent the enemy from marching to Franklin.
Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
On the 21st of November General Hood began his march to Nashville; on the 29th crossed Duck river three miles above Columbia, and then, with Cheatham’s and Stewart’s corps and a division of Lee’s corps, marched to Spring Hill.
Cheatham was in front, and in his official report, dated December 11, 1864, General Hood stated that
Again, in his history of the campaign (“Advance and Retreat,” pp. 285,286) it is related:
“General Stewart was then ordered to proceed to the right of Cheatham and place his corps across the pike north of Spring Hill. By this hour, however, twilight was upon us, when General Cheatham rode up in person. I at once directed Stewart to halt, and turning to Cheatham I exclaimed with deep emotion, as I felt the golden opportunity fast slipping from me, ‘General, why in the name of God have you not attacked the enemy and taken possession of the pike?’”
Lieutenant-General Stewart, referring to this statement in a published letter, says that “no such exclamation by Hood to Cheatham could have been made in my presence.”
Source: Confederate Military History, Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
Sergeant Major Sumner A. Cunningham wrote of the demeanor of Hood’s troops in “Confederate Veteran” magazine in April, 1893,
“…the march to Spring Hill, where the Federal retreat was so nearly cut off, a failure for which it was
understood General Hood was not to blame, created an enthusiasm for him equal to that entertained for Stonewall Jackson after his extraordinary achievements. The soldiers were full of ardor, and confident of success. They had unbounded faith in General Hood, whom they believed would achieve a victory that would give us Nashville.”
“The next (Nov 30) morning, as we marched in quick time toward Franklin, we were confirmed in our impressions of federal alarm. I counted on the way thirty-four wagons that had been abandoned on the smooth turnpike. In some instances whole teams of mules had been killed to prevent their capture.”
Arriving at Winstead Hill, two miles south of Franklin, at about 2:00 P.M., Hood observed the situation. Sergeant Major S. A. Cunningham, standing near to Hood on the hill as Hood contemplated the attack, recalled,
“The enemy were greatly excited. We could see them running to and fro. Wagon trains were being pressed across the Harpeth River, and on toward Nashville…but I was absorbed in the one man whose mind was deciding the fate of thousands. With an arm and a leg in the grave, and with the consciousness that he had not until within a couple of days won the confidence which his army had in his predecessor, he had now a very trying ordeal to pass through.”
Battle of Franklin veteran L.A. Simmons wrote in his 1866 work, The History of the 84th Regiment Illinois Volunteers,
“In speaking of this battle, very many are inclined to wonder at the terrible pertinacity of the rebel General Hood, in dashing column after column with such tremendous force and energy upon our center — involving their decimation, almost their annihilation? Yet this we have considered a most brilliant design, and the brightest record of his generalship, that will be preserved in history. He was playing a stupendous game, for enormous stakes. Could he have succeeded in breaking the center, our whole army was at his mercy. In our rear was a deep and rapid river, swollen by recent rains — only fordable by infantry at one or two places — and to retreat across it an utter impossibility. To break the center was to defeat our army; and defeat inevitably involved a surrender. If this army surrendered to him, Nashville, with all its fortifications, all its vast accumulation of army stores, was at his mercy, and could be taken in a day. Hence, with heavy odds — a vastly superior force — in his hands, he made the impetuous attack upon our center, and lost in the momentous game. His army well understood that they were fighting for the possession of Nashville. Ours knew they were fighting to preserve that valuable city, and to avoid annihilation.”
Hood pondered thet critical dilemma that Nashville lay unprotected, and with only three hours of daylight remaining, decided to order an immediate frontal assault. As Cunningham later wrote,
“While making ready for the charge, General Hood rode up to our lines, having left his escort and staff in the rear. He remained at the front in plain view of the enemy for, perhaps, half an hour making a most careful survey of their lines. It was all-important to act, if at all, at once. He (Hood) rode to Stephen D. Lee, the nearest of his subordinate generals, and, shaking hands with him cordially, announced his decision to make an immediate charge.
Following the evacuation of Atlanta, Confederate General John Bell Hood formulated an elaborate plan to draw General William T. Sherman away from that city and place his own army in position to recapture Middle Tennessee. Hood planned to march his army north, capture the vital Union supply depot of Nashville, and take the war into Kentucky and Ohio.
Initially Hood’s plan worked. Sherman withdrew from Atlanta and followed the Army of Tennessee into North Georgia. There, Sherman realized the numerical superiority of his forces and detached a portion of his army to stay ahead of Hood’s advance north, while he returned with the main force to implement his March to the Sea. General John Schofield, Hood’s West Point classmate, was placed in command of the Fourth and Twenty-third Army Corps and given the task of slowing the Confederate advance to Nashville.
On the afternoon of November 29, 1864, the Army of Tennessee managed to get between Schofield’s command and the federal stronghold at Nashville at the town of Spring Hill. When the Confederate forces failed to cut the road north, the Union troops marched by their enemy in the middle of the night. By the next morning, they had entered Franklin and occupied a series of earthen fortifications on the southern edge of town. During the day, Union soldiers strengthened their already formidable position as Schofield made plans to evacuate Franklin and march to Nashville.
When Hood awoke on November 30 and found that the Union army had escaped, he blamed everyone but himself for the missed opportunity and immediately marched the Army of Tennessee to Franklin. Arriving at Winstead Hill (two miles south of Franklin), Hood determined to make a fight despite the warnings from Generals Nathan Bedford Forrest and Benjamin Cheatham to avoid a frontal assault. The Confederate commander accepted no counsel and ordered his subordinates to prepare for the assault.
Cannon sitting on present-day Winstead Hill, facing north toward downtown Franklin.
At 4:30 in the afternoon, as the sun began to set, the Army of Tennessee stepped off in a three-mile-long battle line to launch the last grand charge of the war in Tennessee. Marching forward in near-parade formation, the leading elements of the Confederate line overwhelmed the advanced Union position one-half mile in front of the main line. Chasing the fleeing Federals, the men of Generals Patrick Cleburne’s and John C. Brown’s divisions smashed into the Union earthworks along the Columbia Pike. Driving the Federals through the front and back yard of Fountain B. Carter’s house and into the front yard of Albert Lotz’s home, the advancing Confederates met a counter charge by Colonel Emerson Opdycke’s brigade. In fierce hand-to-hand fighting, the Federal soldiers forced the Confederates back to the outer ditch of the main earthworks.
Present-day view of Albert Lotz house, adjacent (east) of the farm belonging to F.B. Carter. The Lotz house sits right on the east side of Columbia Pike.
The Confederates made as many as eighteen separate charges but failed to make a significant breach in the Union defenses. Some Confederate attacks occurred so late at night that the soldiers used torches to guide their lines forward. The fight lasted until ten o’clock, leaving Union troops inside the works and Confederates in the outer ditches only a few feet apart. Many soldiers sat with their backs against the works and held their muskets over their heads to fire them into the opposing ranks.
After five hours of bloodletting, the small arms fire died away. Schofield wasted no time pulling his men out of their positions and marching them toward Nashville. That night, as the temperature dropped, the wounded Union and Confederate soldiers left on the field suffered terribly. The dead and dying lay in heaps sometimes five or six deep in the outer ditch. Field hospitals in the Carter and Lotz houses and the Carnton Mansion, treated the seemingly endless stream of wounded.
The battle exacted a disastrous toll on the Confederate forces. Hood sent approximately 23,000 soldiers against a fortified line protected by 15,000 Union soldiers and incurred 7,000 casualties, while the Federals lost approximately 2,500. Of the one hundred Confederate regimental commanders, sixty-three were killed or wounded. The casualty toll among Confederate generals was also high–six killed, five wounded, and one captured. As the Army of Tennessee moved north toward Nashville, a colonel commanded General John C. Brown’s division, and a captain led General Hiram Granbury’s brigade. At the battle of Nashville, two weeks later, the Army of Tennessee was not effective, having left a sizable number of hardened veterans and officers on the field of Franklin.
Source citation: The Tennessee Encyclopedia of History and Culture (online)
TENNESSEE.
______
A Severe Battle at Franklin, Tenn.
________
HOOD DEFEATED BY THOMAS.
________
The Rebels Desperately Assault Our Works.
________
They are Repulsed with Fearful Carnage.
__________
Six Thousand Rebels Killed and Wounded.
_________
TWELVE HUNDRED PRISONERS CAPTURED
____________
Our Loss Less Than One Thousand.
____________
MAGNIFICENT BEHAVIOR OF OUR TROOPS
__________
Full and Graphic Account from Our Special Correspondent.
__________
OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT.
__________
Washington, Thursday, Dec.1.
The following official dispatch concerning the report of the victory in Tennessee, has been received at headquarters:
FRANKLIN, Tenn., Wednesday, Nov.30.
Major-Gen. Thomas:
The enemy made a heavy and persistent attack with two corps, commencing at 4 P.M., and lasting till after dark. He was repulsed at all points with heavy loss — probably of five or six thousand men. Our loss is probably not more than one-fourth of that number. We have captured about one thousand prisoners, including one Brigadier-General.
(Signed,) JOHN SCHOFIELD
Major-General.
__________
OUR SPECIAL ACCOUNT.
__________
Special Dispatch to the New-York Times.
FOUR MILES SOUTH OF NASHVILLE.
Thursday, Dec.1.
Gen. SCHOFIELD yesterday fought one of the prettiest fights of the war, resulting most disastrously to the rebels, with little loss to ourselves. After three days’ skirmishing, the rebels crowded our first line of works yesterday afternoon, and at 4 P.M. made a most desperate attack on our right and centre, forcing our lines to our breastworks, which were thrown up from river to river in an open field on the Cumberland Pike, which ran through the centre of the field.
At least half the rebel force engaged endeavored to pierce our centre, and come down vicuously on WAGNER’S Division, which, after desperate fighting, fell back, and MANY’S rebel division, of FRANK CHEATAM’S corps, got inside our works and captured two guns. Our centre was not broken, however, and, better still, Gen. WAGNER successfully rallied our troops, wgho charged on the enemy, recaptured the two guns, and drove the division over the breastworks, capturing one entire brigade and its commander.
At 4:30 o’clock the battle was waged with unabating vigor, the enemy having made during a half hour several attempts to break our centre.
The Federal position was a magnificent one, and the result of these four days’ work were magnificently grand.
All thi s while the rebels had appeared in front of our right. The plan was to pierce our centre and crush our right wing before dark. A portion of our infantry were engaged three-quarters of an hour firing on the rebel columns who stood their ground like madmen. During the every charge made on our right and centre, volleys of grape and cannister were hurled into their lines, and only darkness prevented their sacrifice being more awful. It is said that no canister shot was used by the rebels during the day, but fired shot and shell.
After the first break of WAGNER’S division and its recovery, our line never budged a step. All was quiet after 10 P.M. It was not only one of the prettiest but cleanest battles of the war. The excessive slaughter of the enemy was owing to our wholesale use of cannister and grape, and our selection of ground. The battle was fought in an open field, with no trees or undergrowth, or other interruption. The enemy’s loss in killed and wounded approximates 7,000, and we have over 1,200 prisoners, and one general officer and several field officers. The Colonel of the Fifteenth Mississippi, a Northern man, of Illinois, was wounded and taken prisoner. Four-fifths of his regiment were killed, wounded or captured. Our loss does not reach a thousand, hors du cambat. Gen. Bradley, of Illinois, while gallantly leading his troops, was severly wounded in the shoulder. Our loss in field officers is very small. Our troops behaved handsomely. SCHOFIELD commanded on the field, STANLEY on the right, and Cox on the left. Gen. Stanley was wounded slightly in the neck, but remained on the field and is all right to-day.
I have told you all along the programme of Gen. Thomas would electrify you, and this is but the epilogue of the battle to come off.
After our dead, wounded and prisoners were cared for, our army fell back to this point, and are in line of battle while I write. Up to this time, 3 P.M., the enemy has not made his appearance. The Third Corps of Veterans are in readiness, and a battle is expected before daylight to-morrow. All Government work is suspended, and all are under arms, from Gen. DONALDSON down to the unscientific laborers.
The falling back of our troops was accomplished at 8 o’clock this morning, and bridges burned across Harpeth River to retard the transportation of rebel supplies. The calvary was handled prettilt by Gen. WILSON, between Spring Hill and Triune.
A.J. SMITH’s corps is in line of battle, and the situation is particularly grand. Forts Negley, Morton, Cairo and Houston are alive, and the infantry movement perfectly satisfacoty. Something must immediately transpire, as Gen. THOMAS is ready to strike no matter how the rebels move.
BENJ. C. TRUMAN
FROM NASHVILLE
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The Position of the Opposing Armies.
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NO FIGHTING SINCE WEDNESDAY
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Hood Demonstrating Toward Murfreesboro
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Further Details of the Battle of Franklin
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THE REBEL GENERAL CLEBURNE KILLED
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The Rebel Loss Fully Six Thousand — Our Loss One Thousand
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GEN. THOMAS MASTER OF THE SITUATION
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Nashville, Friday, Dec. 2
I have received full accounts of the late battle at Franklin, and its antecedents, which was one of the the most brilliant in its general results of the war. For three days sharp skirmishing was kept up during the retirement of our army from Duck River to Franklin, during which time a multiplicity of exploits and successes resulted to the Federal arms.
Gen. Cox conducted the rear guard, and on the 29th ultimately achieved a splendid victory over the rebels at Spring Hill, while General Wilson’s cavalry gained a series of important successes over Forrest’s advance, under Roddy, on the pike between Turner’s and Spring Hill.
During the afternoon of the 30th ultimately the rebel army was sorely pressed under Hood, who had Cheatam’s and Stewart’s corps, and a portion of Dick Taylor’s command, numbering in all over 22,009 men. Owing to Cox’s gallant check at Spring Hill, and portion of the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps were enabled to gain Franklin early in the day, where they threw up a line of breastworks, extending from one end to the other of the curve in the river, behind which our entire infantry command took position.
At precisely four o’clock (afternoon) the entire rebel force made a charge, and succeeded in making a temporary break in our centre, commanded by Wagner. With characteristic impetuosity the soldiers composing Cheatham’s Corps dashed into the breastworks, and cooperating with the attacking party on their left, attempted to envelop and destroy our right. In the nick of time the troops of Wagner were rallied, and throwing their whole force on the rebel column, drove back the storming party in great disorder, capturing several hundred prisoner. Four hours after the rebels charged on these lines, but were repulsed as often with great slaughter.
The rebels numbered at least two to our one, as nearly half of the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps were in reserve. The rebels loss in killed is three times ours, while their wounded is at least six times as large as ours. The wounded of our men are mostly in the head, arms and body.
The artillery fire of the enemy was great precision, but their ammunition consisted chiefly of shot and shell, while for two hours immense quantities of more murderous missles were hurled with fearful fury into the rebel lines. All the attempt of the rebels to gain a permanent advantage were frustrated, and at dark the Federal position was uncharged, while the rebels retired, under cover of the woods, south of the Columbia pike.
The rebel loss, as before stated, is fully 6,000, including over 1,000 prisoners, an unsual number of whom were officers. Our loss reached a total of about 1,000.
An artillery duel was kept up till nearly midnight, when our troops commenced crossing Harpeth River, bringing all our trains and paraphernalia over in safety before daylight.
The army then retired to within four miles of this city, at which point our frontline confronts the enemy. The falling back of the army is in accordance with the programme, and the battle at Franklin, although of the most brilliant kind, was an impromptu affair, and brought about owing to the necessity of checking the rebel advance to secure a safe crossing of the river by our troops.
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LATER
Nashville, Friday, Dec. 2
Additional reports received increase the magnitude of the late victory at Franklin. Thirty stands of colors were captured by our forces. The Forty-ninth Indiana captured five, the Eighty-eighth Illinois three, Reilly’s old brigade eight, and the Twenty-third Corps captured four.
Gen. Stanley, commanding the Fourth Corps, had a very narrow escape, having had a horse killed under him, and was shot in the right shoulder, the ball travelling the back and going out of the left shoulder. He is in the city, and though suffering considerably, is still attending to duty.
It is confirmed that Gen. Cleburne, of Tennessee, is killed.
Gen. Kimball, commanding the Second Division of General Stanley’s Corps, in the heat of the battle passed a rebel Major-General, who told him he was mortally wounded. His men succeeded in carrying off his body.
It is believed that Hood’s main army is threatening Murfreesboro. Forrest’s rebel cavalry is demonstrating on our front and right flank.
Commander Fitch is here with a fleet of boats and Iron-clads. Sufficient forces have arrived to insure not only the safety of Nashville, but another Union victory, is case of a battle, under any circumstances.
The military men all unite in the opinion that Gen. Stanley and Schofield conducted the retirement from Pulaski in the face of the enemy with admirable skill, and crowning all with a magnificent Union victory at Franklin.
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