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The Civil War Preservation Trust (CWPT) publishes an annual report [download 9.5mb]of the ten most endangered Civil War battlefields. Spring Hill (TN) made the list again for 2009.
The action that took place at Spring Hill between the Confederate and Union forces on 29 November 1864 set the stage for the Battle of Franklin on 30 November 1864. It is important to preserve the battlefield at Spring Hill since it is part of the larger story of Hood’s late 1864 campaign in middle Tennessee.
As most rural areas are experiencing significant development in residential and commercial real estate, Spring Hill is no exception.
GM owns roughly 500 acres adjacent to the Rippavilla Plantation. The auto-giant is seeking to sell the property. GM is apparently stipulating that the development company interested in buying the property donate about 100 acres closest to Rippavilla. The entire transaction is unsettled as of April 2009.
See our Rippavilla Flickr folder of pictures.
Dr. Chris Losson, an author and teacher, provides a brief overview of the action from Spring Hill to Franklin in late November 1864.
This is an excerpt from a lecture Dr. Losson gave at the June 2008 Franklin’s Charge symposium in Franklin, TN. Listen why.
Video credit: 2008 Franklin’s Charge symposium
According to historian Eric Jacobson, the Army of Tennessee had 28,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry when it arrived in middle Tennessee in late 1864. Hood took over the Army of Tennessee in July from Johnston. There were 8,000 Federals garrisoned at Nashville at the time.
Hood would lose at least 7,500 at Franklin (30 Nov 1864) and another 6,600 at Nashville, two weeks later. When the Army of Tennessee retreated back to Pulaski in mid December 1864, the army was reduced to but a shadow of its former self.
Confederate General, John Bell Hood
Hood was the fifth commander of the Army of Tennessee. He commanded the army from July 17, 1864, until January 15, 1865. Many historians say his recklessness destroyed the Army of Tennessee. In just six months (July 1864 – December 1864) Hood lost at least 30,000 men* at a time when the Confederate army, and especially the Army of Tennessee, was in desperate need of men.
*Casualty estimates are based on the conservative figures as reported by the National Park Service. Here are the major engagements Hood was involved in from the time he became commander of the Army of Tennessee.
July 20 Peachtree Creek – 4,796
July 22 Atlanta – 8,499
July 28 Ezra Church – 3,000
Aug 31 – Sept 1 Jonesborough – 2,000
Nov 30 Franklin – 6,261
Dec 15 Nashville – 4,462
With the loss of Tennessee in early 1862 – the capture and surrender of Forts 
Henry and Donelson (Feb 62) – the Union victory at Shiloh (April 62) , and the surrender of Vicksburg in July 1863; the South’s Western Theater military strategy had zero margin for error by mid/late 1864.
In light of that background, John Bell Hood seems to have singlehandedly cost the war for the South, or the Western Theater, at the very least, due to his performance in the last six months of 1864, having assumed command of the Army of Tennessee on July 17th, 1864.
a. Hood lost Atlanta on his watch, even though he’d say Johnston lost it. But, Hood wreckless, fight at any cost attitude (having assumed command in mid July 1864) resulted in losing 20,000 men in nine days after he took the AoT over. Hood hastened the loss of Atlanta and then his loss of the supply train to the Federals only showed his strategy for Atlanta was an inch thick. He then over-estimated his ability to draw Sherman out into a fight in the open. Sherman was brilliant in Atlanta.
b. Hood saw some measure of success in the Eastern Theater as a Brigade commander but seems to have had an almost racial dislike for the soldier in the Western Theater. He seemed to think the ANV soldier was superior in essence to the Western Theater soldier.
c. His loss of his leg and arm (1863) probably caused him to over-compensate for being less a man, in his own mind. Then throw in his failure to win the love of Preston Buck and you have a man with mixed passions in 1864.
d. He was no mental heavyweight. He barely survived West Point. He clearly lacked strategic and logistical/administrative abilities. He was a good Brigade Commander because he did not have to execute on those higher levels. A fighter he was. Being able to translate the will and passion to fight in light of the ‘then’-modern technologies, strategies and challenges was another thing.
e. Hood’s propensity for direct frontal assaults was simply ridiculous. He seems to have interpreted using the steel bayonet as a more manly way to fight, combined with assaulting breastworks. Henry repeating rifles could fire off about 20-30 rounds a minute compared to the 3-minute minnie ball. To fail to take this into account at Franklin was beyond my imagination to allow him room for being anything but being virtually insane after the escape of the Federals at Spring Hill.
f. Hood’s losses from Atlanta were devastating to the AoT. Losing 20,000 men in nine days – for his army – would be like Sherman losing perhaps 3-4 times that number. What was he thinking? That he’d actually defeat Sherman by fighting and winning tactically?
g. The Spring Hill situation really showed his weaknesses in many ways.
(1) His physical disabilities prevented him from being mobile and active enough to truely lead an army. His Division and Brigade commanders exhibited some of the bravest action in war at Franklin.
(2) How much did his opium-like medicine impair his ability?
(3) He was so disingenuous in his treatment of his commanders (especially after the war) in assigning blame for Spring Hill.
(4) The performance, or lack thereof, of his division commanders at Spring Hill are a direct reflection of Hood’s own poor logistical oversight. He seems to have very poorly understood the geography of the region.
(5) His lack of and poor administration of Forrest at Spring Hill/Franklin is mysterious.
The assault upon the Federals at Franklin displays Hood’s total ineptitude as a commander of an Army. Why?
1). Did he actually think he could destroy Schofield at Franklin by using just two of his three Corps and mostly not engaging his own artillery?
2). He marched across two miles of open ground before his corps reached the breastworks. It was more insane than Pickett’s Charge, with a greater loss of life too.
3). Had Wagner’s troops not been left out in the open to take the initial beating, then having to run for their lives, resulting in the Federals not being able to shoot the Confederates, the loss of life of Hood’s men would have been even much worse.
4). His inability to size up the situation, post-battle at Franklin, also reveals he did not deserve such authority he was given. To go after Thomas two weeks later was even more insane. At Franklin, Hood lost at least 1,700 in death and nearly 5,000 in wounded, captured or missing.
5). Hood really thought these AoT troops lacked the courage to assault defended breastworks. The Union – at Franklin – had the advantage of strategically placed artillery, defended breastworks, the choice of location to fight, abatis, superior numbers, superior equipment, men who were not nearly as hungry, etc.
Hood fought (late 1864) from a mixture of motives and demons that cost tens of thousands of lives. He had to prove to himself, Davis, and Buck Preston he was a real man; probably to his father as well. Not to mention proving his worthiness to the likes of Lee, Hardee, Johnston, Richard Taylor, and Stonewall Jackson. I think he was intimated by the likes of Cleburne and A.P. Stewart. He was a man of highly questionable integrity and character, as he showed in “reporting” on Johnston during Atlanta.
John Bell Hood got his time in the spotlight from July until December 1864 and the reality is that he was an abysmal failure as a commander of an army.
What a lesson?
When one is finally in a position of authority, one must be ready to execute from the foundation of a character molded in integrity, courage, and capability – birthed in humility. Anything less will reveal the deeply hidden or masked flaws of one’s character in the heat of battle.
Major-General Stanley (right), commanding the Fourth Federal corps, in his official report stated that:
“In view of the strong position we held, nothing appeared so improbable as that they would assault. I felt so confident in this belief that I did not leave General Schofield’s headquarters until the firing commenced.”
Major-General Cox, (bottom right) commanding the Twenty-third corps, and in active command of the Federal line of battle, undertakes to account for the attack made by General Hood thus:
“
His exasperation at what he regarded as a hair’s breadth escape on our part from the toils in which he thought he had encompassed us at Spring Hill had probably clouded his judgment. He blamed some of his subordinates for the hesitation which he seems himself to have been responsible for, and now, in an excitement which led him astray, he determined to risk everything upon a desperate assault.”
The same eminent author, referring to the assault made by Cleburne and Brown on the Federal center, says:
“They were seen coming in splendid array. The sight was one to send a thrill through the heart, and those who saw it have never forgotten its martial magnificence.”
Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
Also read:
- Wikipedia article on Jacob D. Cox
Maj.-Gen. B. F. Cheatham.
“On the morning of the 4th of December,” says General Cheatham, “I went to the headquarters of Gen
eral Hood, and referring to his note and the criticism that had evidently been made by some one, I said to him, ‘A great opportunity was lost at Spring Hill, but you know that I obeyed your orders there, as everywhere, literally and promptly.’ General Hood not only did not dissent from what I said, but exhibited the most cordial manner, coupled with confidence and friendship.”
At daylight Cheatham’s corps passed through the village of Spring Hill, and between 1 and 2 o’clock p.m. the army reached the vicinity of Franklin, and Stewart’s and Cheatham’s corps were put in positions. The enemy was heavily intrenched and was superior in numbers and equipment. On the morning of the battle, General Schofield, commanding the Federal army, had behind his works 23,734 infantry and artillery, and his cavalry numbered 5,500. Maj.-Gen. J. D. Cox, U. S. A., upon whose authority these figures are given, states in his history of the battle of Franklin that Hood delivered the assault on the Federal lines with “two or three hundred less than 24,000″ men, and gives Forrest’s strength at 9,000. Maj.-Gen. John C. Brown reported that on the morning of November 29, 1864, he had not exceeding 2,750 men in his division, the largest in Cheatham’s corps, and the three divisions did not exceed 6,000. Smith’s brigade of Cleburne’s division was not present. Stewart’s corps after Allatoona was less than 7,000, and with Johnson’s division of Lee’s corps, the assaulting column did not exceed 16,000 men. General Forrest stated in his official report that the entire cavalry force under his command was about 5,000.
Bate’s division was on the left, Brown’s in the center, Cleburne’s on the right. General Bate says his line “charged the works of the enemy. 
My right got to the works (the second line) and remained there until morning;’the left was driven back. The enemy’s works were strong and defiant, constructed on a slight elevation, with few obstructions in front for several hundred yards. The works to the left of Carter’s creek turnpike were not strong, and with a vigorous assault should have been carried; a fact, however, not known until next day.” Bate’s division sustained a loss of 47 killed and 253 wounded. Capt. Todd Carter (right), on staff duty with Smith’s Tennessee brigade, fell mortally wounded near the enemy’s works and almost at the door of his father’s house.
No more magnificent spectacle was ever witnessed than the advance of the two divisions commanded by Cleburne and Brown; no two divisions of the army were ever led with greater skill and gallantry; no generals of division were ever supported with better ability by brigade, regimental and company officers. The troops were veterans who had never failed to respond to orders, although discouraged by recent and frequent disasters; and fully alive to the desperation of the assault about to be made, they advanced with noble courage. Before troops of equal numbers in the open field they would have been irresistible, but to attack intrenched troops, superior in numbers, advancing over an open plain without cover, was a disregard of the rules of war, a waste of precious lives, and a wrecking of an army once the pride and hope of the Southwest.
Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
General Forrest reported that after the arrival of Cleburne’s division at Spring Hill,
“I ordered Brig.-Gen. W. H. Jackson to move with his division in the direction of Thompson’s Station and there intercept the enemy. He struck the road at Fitzgerald’s, four miles from Spring Hill, at 11 o’clock, just as the front of the enemy’s column had passed. This attack was a complete surprise, producing much panic and confusion. Brigadier-General Jackson had possession of the pike and fought the enemy until daylight, but receiving no support he was compelled to retire.”
Two small brigades, commanded by Brigadier-Generals Armstrong and Ross, constituted Jackson’s division. If an adequate force had been sent forward to take advantage of the panic and confusion created by Jackson’s attack, a second golden opportunity would not have been lost.
Major-General Bate, referring to an interview with General Hood between the hours of 10 and 12 of the night of the 29th of November, at which General Bate mentioned a conflict in the orders of the general commanding and the corps commander touching the movement of his division, relates that General Hood said:
“It makes no difference now, or it is all right, anyhow, for General Forrest, as you see, has just left and informed me that he holds the turnpike with a portion of his forces north of Spring Hill, and will stop the enemy if he tries to pass toward Franklin, and so in the morning we will have a surrender without a fight.”
He further said in a congratulatory manner, “We can sleep quietly to-night.”
Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
Memphis, Tenn.,
May 20, 1877.
Maj.-Gen. John C. Brown, commanding Cheatham’s division, gave the following account of the same affair:
My division comprised four brigades of infantry, commanded respectively by Gen. S. R. Gist, of South Carolina, Gens. O. F. Strahl, O. W. Gordon and John C. Carter, of Tennessee. The whole command on the morning of November 29, 1864, when I left my bivouac on the Mooresville turnpike in front of Columbia, Tenn., numbered not exceeding 2,750 effective men. Gist’s brigade was the largest and Strahl’s was next in numerical strength, those of Gordon and Carter being about equal in the number of effective men. We started on the march about sunrise, and after traversing cedar brakes and pathless woods, crossed Duck river by a pontoon previously laid, about four miles above Columbia, at or near what was known as Davis’ ferry or Davis’ ford. Conforming to the daily alternations, my division was the rear of your (Cheatham’s) corps. After crossing Duck river, as I now recollect, at or near Bear creek, the commanding general, apprehending an attack on our left flank, ordered your corps, in its march from that point, to move in two parallel columns, so that it could come instantly into action in two lines of battle if attacked on the flank. Accordingly, my division was ordered to form the supporting column, and for that purpose to leave the road by which the main body was moving, and so conform its movements to that of the other two divisions (Cleburne’s and Bate’s), that in coming into action to meet an attack on our left flank, it would occupy a place in rear of and about 400 yards distant from the front line of battle. The march thence to Rutherford’s creek was made pursuant to these orders, and the whole distance thus traversed (five or six miles) was through fields and woods and over rough ground, adding greatly to the fatigues of the day. About the commencement of this movement, or soon afterward, by the orders of the commanding general in person, the whole of Gist’s and about one-half of Strahl’s brigade were detached for picket duty, to be relieved by the orders of the commanding general, thus leaving me with about one-half of my division.
When near Rutherford’s creek, learning that a crossing was not practicable east of the road, I changed the direction of the march to the left into the road and found Bate’s division preparing to cross the stream. After reaching the north bank of the stream, I was ordered to pursue the road leading in the direction of the Caldwell place, while Cleburne’s and Bate’s divisions moved at an angle to the left; but before reaching the Dr. Caldwell house, I was ordered to change the direction of my column to the left, and we reached the “Lewisburg,” or “Rally Hill” pike, near the toll-gate, a distance of one and a half mile from Spring Hill. This was within an hour or an hour and a half of sunset. I could distinctly see the enemy in force, both infantry and artillery, at Spring Hill, but did not, and perhaps could not at that point, see either troops or wagons, moving on the Columbia pike. Forrest’s cavalry were on higher ground northeast of my position. I was ordered to form line of battle and “take” Spring Hill. Gist’s brigade and the detachment from Strahl had not reported. I formed my line as speedily as worn troops could move, and after throwing forward a skirmish line, advanced 400 or 500 yards, when I discovered a line of the enemy thrown out of Spring Hill, across and threatening my right flank, and I then discovered for the first time that General Forrest’s cavalry, which I had been assured would protect my right, had been ordered to another part of the field, leaving me without any protection on my right flank or support in rear. I had neither artillery nor cavalry, and was left in a position where I must meet with inevitable disaster if I advanced on Spring Hill. A hasty consultation with my brigade commanders resulted in a determination to suspend the advance and confer with the corps commander. I need not remind you that in a very few minutes you were upon the field and fully approved of what had been done, as did also General Hood a little later, when he directed that the attack should be delayed until the arrival of Generals Stewart and Gist, and in the meanwhile, that the whole command should be held under orders to advance at a moment’s notice. General Gist’s brigade reported a little after nightfall and was immediately placed in position on my right. General Stewart’s corps came up later and went into bivouac on the stream in rear of my right, where it remained until the following morning. I received no further orders that evening or during the night to advance or change my position. After daylight on the morning of the 30th I took up the line of march for Franklin, the enemy in the meantime having preceded us under circumstances of which you are fully advised.
On the march to Franklin, General Cleburne, with whom I had long enjoyed very close personal relations, sent a message to the head of my column requesting an interview. Allowing my column to pass on, I awaited his arrival. When he came up we rode apart from the column through the fields, and he told me with much feeling that he had heard that the commanding general was endeavoring to place upon him the responsibility of allowing the enemy to pass our position on the night previous. I replied to him that I had heard nothing on that subject and that I hoped he was mistaken. He said, “No, I think not; my information comes through a very reliable channel,” and said that he could not afford to rest under such an imputation, and should certainly have the matter investigated to the fullest extent, as soon as we were away from the immediate presence of the enemy. General Cleburne was quite angry and evidently was deeply hurt, under the conviction that the com-mander-in-chief had censured him. I asked General Cleburne who was responsible for the escape of the enemy during the afternoon and night previous. In reply to that inquiry he indulged in some criticisms of a command (Bate’s division) occupying a position on his left, and concluded by saying that of course the responsibility rests with the commander-in-chief, as he was upon the field during the afternoon and was fully advised during the night of the movement of the enemy. The conversation at this point was abruptly terminated by the arrival of orders from yourself or the commanding general. As he left he said, “We will resume this conversation at the first convenient moment,” but in less than three hours after that time this gallant soldier was a corpse upon the bloody field of Franklin.
Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
Also see:
- Wikipedia article on John C. Brown
Major-General Cheatham gave the following account of the affair at Spring Hill:
In pursuance of orders from army headquarters, my command crossed Duck river on the morning of the 29th of November, 1864, the division of Major-General Cleburne in advance, followed by that of Major-General Bate, the division of Major-General Brown in the rear. The march was made as rapidly as the condition of the road would allow and without occurrence of note, until about 3 o’clock p.m., when I arrived at Rutherford’s creek, two and one-half miles from Spring Hill. At this point General Hood gave me verbal orders as follows: That I should get Cleburne across the creek and send him forward toward Spring Hill, with instructions to communicate with General Forrest, who was near the village, ascertain from him the position of the enemy, and attack immediately; that I should remain at the creek, assist General Bate in crossing his division, and then go forward and put Bate’s command in to support Cleburne, and that he would push Brown forward to join me.
As soon as the division of General Bate had crossed the creek I rode forward, and at a point on the road, about one and a half mile from Spring Hill, I saw the left of Cleburne’s command just disappearing over the hill to the left of the road. Halting there, I waited a few minutes for the arrival of Bate, and formed his command with his right upon the position of Cleburne’s left, and ordered him forward to the support of Cleburne. Shortly after Bate’s division had disappeared over the same range of hills, I heard firing toward Cleburne’s right and just then General Brown’s division had come up. I thereupon ordered Brown to proceed to the right, turn the range of hills over which Cleburne and Bate had crossed, and form line of battle and attack to the right of Cleburne. The division of General Brown was in motion to execute this order when I received a message from Cleburne that his right brigade had been struck in flank by the enemy and had suffered severely, and that he had been compelled to fall back and reform his division with a change of front.
It so happened that the direction of Cleburne’s advance was such as had exposed his right flank to the enemy’s line. 
When his command was formed on the road by which he had marched from Rutherford’s creek, neither the village of Spring Hill nor the turnpike could be seen. Instead of advancing directly upon Spring Hill, his forward movement was a little south of west and almost parallel with the turnpike toward Columbia, instead of northwest upon the enemy’s lines, south and east of the village. A reference to the map will show Cleburne’s line of advance. General Cleburne was killed in the assault upon Franklin the next day, and I had no opportunity to learn from him how it was that the error of direction occurred.
Meanwhile General Bate, whom I had placed in position on the left of Cleburne’s line of march, continued to move forward in the same direction until he had reached the farm of N. F. Cheairs, one and a half mile south of Spring Hill.
After Brown had reached the position indicated to him and had formed a line of battle, he sent to inform me that it would be certain disaster for him to attack, as the enemy’s line extended beyond his right several hundred yards. I sent word to him to throw back his right brigade and make the attack. I had already sent couriers after General Bate to bring him back and direct him to join Cleburne’s left. Going to the right of my line I found Generals Brown and Cleburne, and the latter reported that he had reformed his division. I then gave orders to Brown and Cleburne that as soon as they could connect their lines they should attack the enemy, who were then in sight; informing them at the same time that General Hood had just told me that Stewart’s column was close at hand, and that General Stewart had been ordered to go to my right and place his command across the pike. I furthermore said to them that I would go myself and see that General Bate was placed in position to connect with them, and immediately rode to the left of my line for that purpose.
During all this time I had met and talked with General Hood repeatedly, our field headquarters being not over 100 yards apart. After Cleburne’s repulse I had been along my line and had seen that Brown’s right was outflanked several hundred yards. I had urged General Hood to hurry up Stewart and place him on my right, and had received from him the assurance that this would be done; and this assurance, as before stated, I had communicated to Generals Cleburne and Brown.
When I returned from my left, where I had been to get Bate in position, and was on the way to the right of my line, it was dark; but I intended to move forward with Cleburne and Brown and make the attack, knowing that Bate would be in position to support them. Stewart’s column had already passed by on the way toward the turnpike, and I presumed he would be in position on my right.
On reaching the road where General Hood’s field quarters had been established, I found a courier with a message from General Hood requesting me to come to him at Captain Thompson’s house, about one and a fourth miles back on the road to Rutherford’s creek. I found General Stewart and General Hood. The commanding general there informed me that he had concluded to wait till morning, and directed me to hold my command in readiness to attack at daylight.
I was never more astonished than when General Hood informed me that he had concluded to postpone the attack till daylight. The road was still open–orders to remain quiet until morning–and nothing to prevent the enemy from marching to Franklin.
Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
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