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The 183rd Ohio had 23 men killed or mortally wounded at Franklin. Part of Strickland’s Brigade, the 183rd was a newly formed Regiment and had not seen any action prior to Franklin. The 183rd was on the Carter grounds, just west of the Carter House, when the fighting broke out.
Refer to my Google Map to see where the 183rd was placed at Franklin in relation to other Union regiments.
The following men of the 183rd Ohio men are buried at Nashville National Cemetery.
Joseph A. Belch was 18 years old when he enlisted in October 1864, Co.A., he died of disease on 2/6/65 at Nashville. Buried at Nashville National Cemetery. Gravesite: H-245.
William Hauer was 18 years old when he enlisted in September 1864, Co.C., he died of disease on 1/22/65 at Nashville. Buried at Nashville National Cemetery. Gravesite: H-269.
Jeremiah Houser was just 18 years old when he enlisted in October 1864, Co.G., he died of disease on 1/10/65 at Nashville. Buried at Nashville National Cemetery, Gravesite: E-2726.
John Lambur was just 16 years old when he enlisted in August 1864, Co. E., he was mortally wounded at Franklin, severe wound in left arm (amputated); died 12/8/64 in Nashville. Buried at Nashville National Cemetery.
Joseph S. Lee was 25 years old when he enlisted in September 1864, Co.A., he died of disease on 1/16/65 at Nashville. Buried at Nashville National Cemetery, Gravesite:G-378.
William Sheldon was 28 years old when he enlisted in September 1864, Co.A. He was mortally wounded at Franklin and died on 12/17/64 at Nashville. Buried at Nashville National Cemetery, Gravesite: G-145.
Lorence Stork was 40 years old when he enlisted in October 1864, Co.H., mortally wounded at Franklin. Died January 7, 1865 at Nashville. Buried at Nashville National Cemetery, Gravesite: G-411.
Richmond Daily Dispatch
Wednesday, December 21, 1864
From Hood’s Army
We are again, and are likely to be for a week to come, dependent upon the Yankee press for news from Tennessee. Unofficial telegrams from Nashville state that they have at that place five thousand prisoners and forty-nine pieces of cannon, taken from Hood during the battles of the 15th and 16th. We are not in a position to disprove these statements, but we have repeatedly known quite as positive announcements to turn absolutely false and unfounded. Perhaps the telegraph is again to blame, as, from Stanton’s bulletin, it appears to have been diminishing Thomas’s casualties from three thousand to three hundred.
It is noticeable that Thomas sends no telegram on the 17th, and that the “un-official” telegrams say nothing of what is going on, and do not tell us where Hood is. It is not impossible that matters have taken a turn, at once unexpected and unpleasant to Thomas, who, on the 16th, according to his matters have taken a turn, at once unexpected and unpleasant to Thomas, who, on the 16th, according to his own account, was driving our army down ten or a dozen turnpikes at once. Perhaps General Forrest, with his splendid cavalry, have turned up in the right place and put a sudden change upon affairs. He has a way of turning up unexpectedly, and always make his presence felt. He had had abundant time to rejoin Hood, even though he were at Murfreesboro’ when the fight began; and we think there is little doubt he has done so. This assurance, and the knowledge of the weight of Forrest’s sword and presence, together with the certain conviction that Thomas would have telegraphed Stanton had he had anything agreeable to communicate, cause us still to hope that General Hood’s condition is by no means hopeless; and that his army is not, as the enemy express the hope, in danger of being “crushed”.
I recently acquired a letter written by a 117th Illinois Infantry soldier named Thomas A. Whitesides. It is dated Nashville, Tenn., December 6th, 1864. Whitesides wrote this letter to his wife who was living in Belleville, Illinois. This letter was written just six days after the Battle of Franklin (30 November 1864).
Thomas A. Whitesides enlisted August 12, 1862 as a Corporal. On September 19, 1862, he mustered into Company H of the 117th Illinois Infantry at Camp Butler in Springfield, Illinois. He mustered out on August 5th, 1865, having served nearly three years in the service for the Union.
Whitesides would have seen action with the 117th in places like Vicksburg (summer 1863); western Tennessee chasing after Nathan Bedford Forrest’s cavalry (Dec 1863); the Red River expedition and the Battle of Pleasant Hill (Feb 1864); the Battle of Franklin (30 Nov 1864) and the Battle of Nashville (Dec 15-16th, 1864).
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Nashville, Tenn
Dec 6th, 1864
Dear wife,
I seat myself to fulfill my promise in my last [letter]. I told you I would write the first opportunity. Thies [sic] few lines leave us well and I hope to find all of you the same. We have moved our position to the left and thrown up breastworks waiting an attack. Skirmishing is kept us all the while night and day by the picket. Shelling is quite common all along the line. I suppose hood [CSA Gen. John Bell Hood] is going to seige us out of here as he don’t advance only at night. They have thrown up [breast] works every night and still getting closer. Their line and ours are one mile of each other. Hood sent a flag of truce [end page one] yesterday wanting to exchange prisoners that were taken in the late battle [Franklin: 30 Nov 1864]. I suppose he is short of supplies and don’t wish to feed men that are not fighting for him.
The prisoners say they don’t get fourth rations and if they don’t take this place before long they will be without any as they are so far from base of supplies and no railroad to ship on. It is rumored round camp that Rosecrans is commencing with reinforcements for us. I don’t credit the report though I would like for some good General to get in the rear of them and close in so they would have to get up and dust. I see in yesterdays paper that Sherman had got through to the coast. I would be pleased to know he had released our prisoners at Antietam [probably means Andersonville]. [end page two]
I hear that Don Morrison has gone to France as he couldn’t stand for the Stars and Stripes to float over him.
Olive, I have been tempted to ask a favor of you for some time past and I fear you will not be so free to grant it. I will make all fair promises imaginable. I wish your photograph. I will pray for a half dozen and I promise to return it if you should call for it. Tell me at once if I can have it.
I must close for present.
I remain as ever your affectionate friend,
Thomas Whiteside
PS
Our Co [Company] is on picket tonight. I guess we may have a good time with the Rebs.
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Copyright 2009, The Civil War Gazette. All rights reserved.
Dr. Chris Lossom, an author and teacher, ponders the effect the defeat at Franklin (30 Nov 1864) had on the Confederate Army of Tennessee at the Battle of Nashville, two weeks later.
This is an excerpt from a lecture Dr. Lossom gave at the June 2008 Franklin’s Charge symposium in Franklin, TN
Notes from the Professor. We asked the Professor this question; “In your view, did Franklin/Nashville have a significant impact on the overall Civil War?”
Franklin and Nashville had a limited impact on the overall course of the war simply because they failed to change anything. The Union controlled Tennessee before the campaign and controlled it even more solidly afterward. Confederate chances for success in the campaign were, from the outset, rather desperate. The impact of the battles was 1) to increase the overall Confederate death toll of the war, and 2) to remove whatever latent threat to Union control of Tennessee might have been posed by Hood’s army lurking in north Alabama. For example, it seems unlikely that Schofield’s two corps would have been shifted to the east coast if Hood, with an as yet unbroken Army of Tennessee, were still lurking just outside the state, threatening to move north.
And yet, would that have changed the outcome of the war? No, Sherman could have accomplished his purpose without Schofield, and the overall outcome would have been the same. Perhaps the crowning irony of the battles of Franklin and Nashville is that they were fought at a time when the war was already decided. by late November 1864 it is difficult to imagine any train of events that could have led to Confederate victory.
Steven E. Woodworth is Professor of History at TCU in Texas.
Among his publications are Jefferson Davis and His Generals (University Press of Kansas, 1990), Davis and Lee at War (University Press of Kansas, 1995), Leadership and Command in the American Civil War (Savas Woodbury, 1996), The American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research (Greenwood, 1996), A Deep Steady Thunder (McWhiney Foundation, 1996), Six Armies in Tennessee (1998), The Musick of the Mocking Birds, The Roar of the Cannon (University of Nebraska Press, 1998), The Art of Command in the Civil War (University of Nebraska Press, 1998), Civil War Generals in Defeat (University Press of Kansas, 1999), This Grand Spectacle (McWhiney Foundation, 1999), Chickamauga: A Battlefield Guide (University of Nebraska Press, 1999), No Band of Brothers (University of Missouri Press, 1999), The Human Tradition in the Civil War and Reconstruction (Scholarly Resources, 2000), Cultures in Conflict (Greenwood, 2000), Grant’s Lieutenants from Cairo to Vicksburg (University Press of Kansas, 2001), While God is Marching On: The Religious World of Civil War Soldiers (University Press of Kansas, 2001), Beneath a Northern Sky: A Short History of the Gettysburg Campaign (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), The Oxford Atlas of the Civil War (Oxford University Press, 2004), Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865 (Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), and Shiloh: A Battlefield Guide (University of Nebraska Press, 2006).
Dr. Chris Losson, an author and teacher, explains how the Franklin action was a continuation of the Atlanta Campaign. This is an excerpt from a lecture Dr. Losson gave at the June 2008 Franklin’s Charge symposium in Franklin, TN. Listen why.
Video credit: 2008 Franklin’s Charge symposium
More: Was the potential of a Confederate capture of Nashville in 1864 likely?
Professor Steven Woodworth tackles that question.
Notes from the Professor: Dr. Steven E. Woodworth. We asked the Professor this question: Was the potential of a Confederate capture of Nashville in 1864 likely in your estimation?
Actually, I think a Confederate capture of Nashville in 1864 was as close to being impossible as almost anything we study in history. The more likely means by which Hood might have achieved greater success would have been by by-passing Nashville and penetrating much farther north–though the season of the year was much against it. And even at that, he wouldn’t have changed the course of the war. If he could, by some miracle, have taken Nashville, that certainly would have been a major headache for the Union high command, but ultimately, with Lincoln having been reelected, the North was committed to waging the war for up to another 4 years if necessary. Lee’s army could not have survived more than a couple of weeks longer than it did, and then Hood’s would have been the only major Confederate army left in the field. Can you imagine him with, say, 30,000 men, besieged in Nashville by perhaps 200,000 or more Union troops, led once again–as had not occurred since Chattanooga–by the combined leadership skills of Grant, Sherman, Thomas, and Sheridan? And with not even the most remote possibility of a Confederate army marching to his relief? In short, the final outcome might have been delayed, and thus attended with even more brutality and destruction, but it would have been the same. The last point in the war at which I can see any remote but semi-realistic hope of Confederate victory was the day before election-day, 1864. And for practical purposes, that election was probably decided on September 1, when Atlanta fell.
Steven E. Woodworth is Professor of History at TCU in Texas.
Among his publications are Jefferson Davis and His Generals (University Press of Kansas, 1990), Davis and Lee at War (University Press of Kansas, 1995), Leadership and Command in the American Civil War (Savas Woodbury, 1996), The American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research (Greenwood, 1996), A Deep Steady Thunder (McWhiney Foundation, 1996), Six Armies in Tennessee (1998), The Musick of the Mocking Birds, The Roar of the Cannon (University of Nebraska Press, 1998), The Art of Command in the Civil War (University of Nebraska Press, 1998), Civil War Generals in Defeat (University Press of Kansas, 1999), This Grand Spectacle (McWhiney Foundation, 1999), Chickamauga: A Battlefield Guide (University of Nebraska Press, 1999), No Band of Brothers (University of Missouri Press, 1999), The Human Tradition in the Civil War and Reconstruction (Scholarly Resources, 2000), Cultures in Conflict (Greenwood, 2000), Grant’s Lieutenants from Cairo to Vicksburg (University Press of Kansas, 2001), While God is Marching On: The Religious World of Civil War Soldiers (University Press of Kansas, 2001), Beneath a Northern Sky: A Short History of the Gettysburg Campaign (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), The Oxford Atlas of the Civil War (Oxford University Press, 2004), Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865 (Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), and Shiloh: A Battlefield Guide (University of Nebraska Press, 2006).
According to historian Eric Jacobson, the Army of Tennessee had 28,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry when it arrived in middle Tennessee in late 1864. Hood took over the Army of Tennessee in July from Johnston. There were 8,000 Federals garrisoned at Nashville at the time.
Hood would lose at least 7,500 at Franklin (30 Nov 1864) and another 6,600 at Nashville, two weeks later. When the Army of Tennessee retreated back to Pulaski in mid December 1864, the army was reduced to but a shadow of its former self.
Confederate General, John Bell Hood
Hood was the fifth commander of the Army of Tennessee. He commanded the army from July 17, 1864, until January 15, 1865. Many historians say his recklessness destroyed the Army of Tennessee. In just six months (July 1864 – December 1864) Hood lost at least 30,000 men* at a time when the Confederate army, and especially the Army of Tennessee, was in desperate need of men.
*Casualty estimates are based on the conservative figures as reported by the National Park Service. Here are the major engagements Hood was involved in from the time he became commander of the Army of Tennessee.
July 20 Peachtree Creek – 4,796
July 22 Atlanta – 8,499
July 28 Ezra Church – 3,000
Aug 31 – Sept 1 Jonesborough – 2,000
Nov 30 Franklin – 6,261
Dec 15 Nashville – 4,462
Surgeon W.B. Wall (C.S.A.)
Army Tenn.,
Dec. 13, 1864
My Dear Wife,
I hope you have recvd. some of the letters I have written lately as in them I gave you all the news from your relatives. They were well. No letter from you yet of later date than Oct. 21st. The time seems very long to me. It snowed here about a week ago. It is still 
upon the ground. The weather has been quite cold the thermometer standing from 12 to 15 degrees below zero. You would probably like to know how I am situated. Well, Dr. Phillips & myself took possession of a negro cabin that was nearly filled with corn. This we had thrown in the loft to the back of the cabin leaving us about half the room. It is well pointed & has an excellent fire place. We have some boxes & broken chairs to sit on so you see we are doing finely. At night we put down hay & spread our blankets on that for sleeping. We get plenty fat beef to eat & have but little to do except make ourselves comfortable. I have had only one man to report to me sick this month & there wasn’t much the matter with him. I don’t know how the men out on the lines stand the cold as they do. They have no extra amount of clothing, but few blankets & scarce of wood they suffer with cold, but endure it without much complaint. The wind is blowing fiercely today. We are in camp four miles from Nashville. You will have probably killed hogs before you get this. Let me know how much you made. Will you have corn enough or have you bought more? Like all of us I know you are anxious to learn what the army is doing & what it will do next. Well all I can tell you is we have dug trenches & are lying in them hoping the enemy will attack us. I have no thought we will attack them at Nashville and as to what we will do next I can give you no intimation for I have not the least knowledge of Gen. Hood’s intentions. Now, when will the war end? This is a hard question & one I am entirely unable to answer. I have no thought it will ever end in our subjugation. It makes me sad to think of being separated from you so much & so long, but I hope before a great while to be where you can at least visit me occasionally. Don’t allow yourself to become despondent but try to keep cheerful looking forward to a better day. Tell Laura and Mannie not to forget Papa. Hug & kiss them for me. Much love to Mrs. Oliver. I feel under deep & lasting obligations to her for her kindness to you & the children. Tell all the servants howdy & tell them to take care of the stock & not let it stray off or starve. I hope next year if the war continues to be where I can come home more frequently. I don’t wish to quit the service if I can remain in it & give home the necessary attention. I wrote you that Frank Robinson [probably was C. Franklin Robertson] was killed on the [Nov.] 30th at Franklin & Lt. Brown had his arm broken.
Your devoted Husband,
W.B. Wall
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William B.[Burgeess] Hall enlisted as a surgeon in the 33rd Miss. Infantry, Company I.
According to Wikipedia:
Thomas planned to strike both of Hood’s flanks, with a minor attack on the Confederate right and the major effort on the left. Before daylight on December 15, the division led by Maj. Gen. James Steedman hit the Confederate right and held down one corps there for the rest of the day. The attack on the left, under Schofield, leading two corps and a division, began after noon with a charge up Montgomery Hill and it had a devastating effect on the entire Confederate line. Hood’s army was battered, but not routed. Fighting stopped at dark and Hood reformed his men for the second day of battle. He established a main line of resistance along the base of a ridge about two miles south of the former location, throwing up new works and fortifying hills on their flanks. Union troops marched out close to the Confederate’s new line and began constructing fieldworks on the morning of December 16. Once again Thomas planned to attack on both flanks, but the initial attack on the strongly fortified Confederate right was unsuccessful. It was followed by the stronger left flank attack under Schofield, Smith, and Wilson, which succeeded. Their success inspired Thomas J. Wood and James B. Steedman to resume their attack on the right flank, which overran the Confederates. Hood’s army collapsed and fled in a heavy rain in the direction of Franklin.
The 33rd Mississippi lost its flag in the Battle of Franklin.
Collection of the Old Capitol Museum of Mississippi History, Jackson, MS.
The 33rd Miss., Company B, were known as the Amite County Guards.
The following 33rd men were killed at Franklin. It is likely that Surgeon Wall attended their wounds and/or their deaths: 1st Lt. John Powell, (Acting Major when killed Franklin, Co.B.), Alex Stewart (Co.,B.). For a complete list of the 33rd’s casualties see this site.
Dr. George C. Phillips, Surgeon for the 22nd Mississippi, watching the Battle with Surgeon W.B. Hall on top of a hill wrote, “This was the first and only time I ever heard our bands playing upon a battlefield and at the beginning of a charge…When within three hundred yards of their breastworks a cannon boomed from their fort (Granger) across the little river north of the town. This seemed to be the signal waited for. A sheet of flame and smoke burst from the entire crescent of the enemy’s breastworks, answered by the Rebel yell and musketry fire from our men. In a moment the whole valley was so filled with smoke that nothing could be seen but the flashes of cannon and musketry.”
General Hood reported the loss of the army of Tennessee at 4,500. The loss of Schofield’s army numbered 2,326 killed, wounded and missing. Of this number, 1,104 were captured by the Confederates, about 600 of them by Brown and Cleburne from the enemy’s line in advance of his intrenchments.
Gen. J. D. Cox says the Federal loss in killed was “trifling everywhere but near the center,” the point assailed by Cleburne and Brown. No report with list of casualties was ever made, and no data exist for the ascertainment of the actual losses of these two divisions, but it must have been 40 per cent in killed, wounded and missing. In Quarles’ Tennessee brigade of Stewart’s corps, the loss was just as great, and the death rate in Stewart’s and Cheatham’s corps was out of the usual proportion. It was great enough to make Tennessee a land of mourning.
The attacks of the Confederates were repeated at intervals until dark, and on part of the line until 9 o’clock. At midnight the Federal forces were withdrawn and marched to Nashville.
After our dead comrades were buried and the wounded of both armies provided for, the army of Tennessee moved forward to the front of Nashville, where on the 2d of December a line of battle was formed and intrenchments provided. Smith’s brigade of Cleburne’s division came up, and Ector’s brigade of Stewart’s corps rejoined the army, which was now 23,053 strong, opposed to an army under Gen. George H. Thomas of more than three times that number.
Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
The following communication, written by Governor (afterward Senator) Harris of Tennessee, then acting as aide to General Hood, is a valuable contribution to the history of this campaign. It is copied from Drake’s “Annals of the Army of Tennessee,” for May, 1877. A copy was furnished to General Hood:
Gov. James D. Porter:
Dear Sir:
In answer to yours of the 12th instant, I have to say that on the night that the army of Tennessee, under command of Gen. J. B. Hood, halted at Spring Hill on its march from Columbia to Nashville, General Hood, his adjutant-general, Major Mason, and myself occupied the same room at the residence of Captain Thompson, near the village. Late at night we were aroused by a private soldier, who reported to General Hood that on reaching the camp near Spring Hill he found himself within the Federal lines; that the troops were in great confusion, a part of them were marching in the direction of Franklin, others had turned toward Columbia, and that the road was blocked with baggage-wagons and gun-carriages, rendering it impossible to move in order in either direction. Upon the receipt of this report, General Hood directed Major Mason to order General Cheatham to move down on the road immediately and attack the enemy. General Hood and myself remained in bed. I went to sleep, and I supposed that General Hood did the same. At daylight on the following morning we learned that the Federal army had left Spring Hill and was being concentrated at Franklin.
On the march to Franklin, General Hood spoke to me, in the presence of Major Mason, of the failure of General Cheatham to make the night attack at Spring Hill, and censured him in severe terms for his disobedience of orders. Soon after this, being alone with Major Mason, the latter remarked that “General Cheatham was not to blame about the matter last night. I did not send him the order.” I asked if he had communicated the fact to General Hood. He answered that he had not. I replied that it is due to General Cheatham that this explanation should be made. Thereupon Major Mason joined General Hood and gave him the information. Afterward General Hood said to me that he had done injustice to General Cheatham, and requested me to inform him that he held him blameless for the failure at Spring Hill. And, on the day following the battle of Franklin, I was informed by General Hood that he had addressed a note to General Cheatham, assuring him that he did not censure or charge him with the failure to make the attack.
Very respectfully,
ISHAM G. HARRIS
Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
Also see:
Sergeant Major Sumner A. Cunningham wrote of the demeanor of Hood’s troops in “Confederate Veteran” magazine in April, 1893,
“…the march to Spring Hill, where the Federal retreat was so nearly cut off, a failure for which it was
understood General Hood was not to blame, created an enthusiasm for him equal to that entertained for Stonewall Jackson after his extraordinary achievements. The soldiers were full of ardor, and confident of success. They had unbounded faith in General Hood, whom they believed would achieve a victory that would give us Nashville.”
“The next (Nov 30) morning, as we marched in quick time toward Franklin, we were confirmed in our impressions of federal alarm. I counted on the way thirty-four wagons that had been abandoned on the smooth turnpike. In some instances whole teams of mules had been killed to prevent their capture.”
Arriving at Winstead Hill, two miles south of Franklin, at about 2:00 P.M., Hood observed the situation. Sergeant Major S. A. Cunningham, standing near to Hood on the hill as Hood contemplated the attack, recalled,
“The enemy were greatly excited. We could see them running to and fro. Wagon trains were being pressed across the Harpeth River, and on toward Nashville…but I was absorbed in the one man whose mind was deciding the fate of thousands. With an arm and a leg in the grave, and with the consciousness that he had not until within a couple of days won the confidence which his army had in his predecessor, he had now a very trying ordeal to pass through.”
Battle of Franklin veteran L.A. Simmons wrote in his 1866 work, The History of the 84th Regiment Illinois Volunteers,
“In speaking of this battle, very many are inclined to wonder at the terrible pertinacity of the rebel General Hood, in dashing column after column with such tremendous force and energy upon our center — involving their decimation, almost their annihilation? Yet this we have considered a most brilliant design, and the brightest record of his generalship, that will be preserved in history. He was playing a stupendous game, for enormous stakes. Could he have succeeded in breaking the center, our whole army was at his mercy. In our rear was a deep and rapid river, swollen by recent rains — only fordable by infantry at one or two places — and to retreat across it an utter impossibility. To break the center was to defeat our army; and defeat inevitably involved a surrender. If this army surrendered to him, Nashville, with all its fortifications, all its vast accumulation of army stores, was at his mercy, and could be taken in a day. Hence, with heavy odds — a vastly superior force — in his hands, he made the impetuous attack upon our center, and lost in the momentous game. His army well understood that they were fighting for the possession of Nashville. Ours knew they were fighting to preserve that valuable city, and to avoid annihilation.”
Hood pondered thet critical dilemma that Nashville lay unprotected, and with only three hours of daylight remaining, decided to order an immediate frontal assault. As Cunningham later wrote,
“While making ready for the charge, General Hood rode up to our lines, having left his escort and staff in the rear. He remained at the front in plain view of the enemy for, perhaps, half an hour making a most careful survey of their lines. It was all-important to act, if at all, at once. He (Hood) rode to Stephen D. Lee, the nearest of his subordinate generals, and, shaking hands with him cordially, announced his decision to make an immediate charge.
Note: the 64th Ohio (at Franklin) was part of Wagner’s Division, 3rd Brigade (Col. Joseph Conrad), Stanley’s 4th Corps.
Sarah V. Elder Dicken Papers
Transcripts of Correspondence, September – December 1864
MS-997
Camp Near Columbia Tenn
December 21st/64
Mr L. Cessna
Dear Sir with my wife requested I shal tri to drop you a few lines too let you know that I am well & feel prety well on this campagne that is in progress at this present time & with the ide of Jeneral Hoods retreate towards the tennasee river well now there I shal tri too tell you a litle of our retrie from Pulaki too Nashville Tenn we had a prety good road too gow on that was some thing shre they mad us make quick time of it we travelled a bout 20 or 25 miles prday the distents between Nash & Pulaki was 75 miles we got a long as far as too spring hill firste till the Johneys trid too flank us there we had a quite a dandy old fight there with the mounted infantry the rather flanked us they on the a count of there haven a bout 6 too wone of us then dooring the knight we fell back too Franklin there we had another trille of it that is a trile that proved a perfect slater too the Johnneys all though we had a good maney of our very bravest boys killed then we had old Peter Sarge killed thare & a great maney others killed that well this ends this. then we lit out for Nashville then we went in too camp there for a few days & all this time the Johnneys tride too get in their town thru old Jeneral Hood told these men that if they would take the sity that he would dress them all in the darnd Yankeys clothe that is all officers uniforms there four they fought like tiger but Jeneral Thomas took them on the flank which did knot aggee with ther system. the fight commenced on our write flank on the morning of the 18 & we flanked theme out of there works on that side the uncore while our lines war 7 mils long there four we had 2 days prety hard fighting sow hard that the first to charge that we made on the firste day we gave back for a bout 1 hour thin hour darkess made a desperate charge on there lefte of them we wated in & gobleed a bout 5 thousand of them then they began too lite out of there hideing plases & know we have bin after them for a few days & have bin taken prisners every day untill too day But our cavlery is after there prety keen in all of the prisners that we had taken will amount too a bout 12 or 15 thousand But I cannot tell anything to the the sertenty a bout that for (—-) have the papers thare & they can tell you the beste a Bout that therfour I will leave that subject with them & You too get a long with as well as you can well as for a chap too tell you a bout those 3 battles I was in them all But wone & than wone was at franklin
the wreason that I was knot in that Batle was this I was on guard the knight befour at spring hill & the regment left me in the rear too guard them too Franklen the teemes there I got threw before the fight commenced there four you can see that I was knot in too it but they all said that was the hardest fight of the 3. I was a litle sorrow that I was knot their But I looked on & wished our men well & I think that it was granted by the old gentleman that is a looking on with a long eye & says gow in yankeys the day is hours, yet all though the time of retreite that we just have ben a gowing there befour we gained the day over Jeneral Hood I thing that he is a litle demoralised I think that if thay would chase us like we have chaste them I think that but little fighitng they would get out of those yankeys of this department well I think that this will suffice for the firste leter knot knowing the sircumstances of your sittuation I think that I will half too close all though perhaps I did knot give you but little satisfaction about hour march & times that we have had all though I think that I could give you a prety good histry of it Bt time will not admitt it I will do bete the next time thus I will close I hope that those few lines will knot demoralise you sow that you will knot forget too write too me then I will close hoping too hear from you all soon but tell Tip too drop a line too me this is all \r & parley done
write soon
I Still remain yours as ever
JH Dicken
Directions & inspections
Co Your leters too
Co A 64 Ohio OVI
3 Brigade 2 Division
Harney Corps
VIA Nashville
Tennissee
At the time of the Civil War Joshua Dicken served initially with the 3 month service of Co.H, 21st Ohio Volunteer Infantry. Then in Sept. 1861 he joined Co.K, 49th O.V.I, (being discharged on disability the following year). He was later drafted at the age of 26 on Sept. 29, 1864 for 1 year service with Co.A, 64th O.V.I.
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Edited section of his letter related to Franklin (correcting grammar and spelling):
…. we got along as far as Spring Hill first till the Johnny’s (Johnny Rebs) tried to flank us there. We had a quite a dandy old fight there with the mounted infantry. They flanked us there on account of them having about six to one of us. Then during the night (Nov 30th) we fell back to Franklin where we had another thrill of it, that is, a thrill that proved a perfect slaughter to the Johnnies, although we had a good many of our very bravest boys killed. Old Peter Sorg was killed there and a great many others killed.
- Joshua Dicken, Co.A, 64th O.V.I. Written on December 21st near Columbia, Tenn., just five days after fighting in the battle of Nashville, and three weeks after fighting at Franklin.
In his original letter Dickens says that Peter Sarge was killed. The correct name is Peter Sorg. Sorg was 43 years old when he enlisted on 9/27/64. He was a member of Company A, with Dickens.
Reference notes: Jacobson, Sword nor McDonough refer to Dickens or this letter.
Nashville, Tenn
Dec 4th, 1864
Dear Father,
I have not written to you since I was at Chattanooga but we have been run about so that I have scarecly had time.
I have not had a letter from home since we left Decatur, GA and I am anxious to hear from you. I received the articles you sent me by Busley, I was glad to get them and thank you for sending them.
We had a pretty hard time for a few days. We were at Columbia about 8 or 10 days. At the time the rebels advanced on that place. Our regt was laying on Duck River guarding the fords. Six companies under Col. McQuiston were at Williamsport and 4 companies ‘B’ ‘C’ and G and our company under Col. Walter were at Gordon’s ferry 4 miles farther down the regt., while the 91st Ind., was at a point farther down the river. When our army fell back to Franklin, we were cut off from it. The army evacuated Columbia in the morning and we did not receive notice of it till 12 o’clock that night, we immediately started. We marched till day light when we halted about 30 minutes for breakfast and then resumed the marched, we marched all day and in the evening found we were cut off from our army and in the rear of Hood’s army.
We marched around the rear of the rebels, passing within 2 miles of their camp fires and stopped past his flank. All this time they were fighting hard at Franklin, had they not been we could not possibly have escaped. About 10 o’clock that night we reached the Big Harpeth river and were safe. We marched 47 miles that day. The next day we came to Nashville. It was reported and believed here that we were captured. I suppose you have read at home that we were. That day I had more expectations of being in some southern prison by this time.
We are laying in the trenches here expecting an attack at any moment. We have got to fight here and fight hard. I hope they will at any rate, for I would fight them here than any place else. We have got to fight them sometime and I would just as big to it now as any other time, and rather do it here than any where else.
They are fighting on our right today, I do not know how the fight is going. I am as well and stout as ever and expect to remain so. Newt & Billy Matkin & Tom Anderson are all well.
You need not look for me home this winter, as I have not the least idea of being able to get a furlough, as long as the fighting continues.
John R. Miller
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