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The divisions of Cleburne and Brown made the assault upon the Federal works around 4:30 pm. The shock-attach was so powerful it knocked three Federal regiments on their heels. The Rebels nearly landed a knock-out punch at Franklin. But Emerson Opdycke’s Brigade staunched the flow and saved the day for the Federals. In the assault, Cleburne was shot through the heart.
A historical marker on the site where Cleburne’s assault and death took place honors the fallen Confederate hero. Recently, the Franklin community – through the leadership of Franklin’s Charge – recovered a one-acre piece of ground that was part of the epicenter of this assault. Read about the historic event.
Cleburne’s death was a devastating loss for the Army of Tennessee. The December 3rd edition of The New York Times headlined, “The Rebel General Cleburne Killed.”
Pistol image is used by permission of the Layland Musuem, Cleburne, texas.
The 24th South Carolina served with Gist’s Brigade, Brown’s Division at Franklin. 1st Lt. James A Tillman served as an officer for the 24th South Carolina.
The 24th also fought at Franklin with the 46th and 65th Georgia; the 2nd Georgia Sharpshooters Battalion, and the 16th South Carolina.
The 24th was part of the regiments who clashed with the Union Brigades of Opdycke and Strickland near the Carter House, on the west side of the Columbia Pike.
Fifteen of Tillman’s comrades are known to be buried at McGavock Cemetery.
Picture credit: The Arms and Equipment of the Confederacy (p. 169)
Major Williams J. Crook, 13th Tennessee Infantry, was lucky enough to survive the Battle of Franklin. The 13th was part of Vaughan’s Brigade, under Brig Gen George B. Gordon. The 13th TN fought with the 11th, 12th/47th, 29th and 51st/52nd TN Infantries at Franklin.
The 13th TN was on the furthest right of the advancing Gordon Brigade, just west of the Columbia Turnpike. Gordon’s men overtook Wagner’s (Union) men as they retreated back behind the Federal line in the opening battle sequence. Once reaching the Federal line in front of the Fountain Branch Carter farm, Gordon’s Brigade and he 13th TN met fierce resistance from Opdycke’s and Strickland’s Briagades. There was brutal hand-to-hand fighting here.
Picture credit: Arms and Equipment of the Confederacy, (p. 168)
Five of Crook’s fellow regimental comrades – 13th Tennesseans – rest peacefully from the guns at McGavock Cemetery in Franklin.
This is the overcoat worn by Col. Ellison Capers, of the 24th South Carolina, Gist’s Brigade, Brown’s Division. Fifteen (15) 24th SC boys are buried at McGavock Cemetery.
Picture credit: Arms and Equipment of the Confederacy (p. 150).
Regarding action Capers and the 24th saw at Franklin, Jacobson writes:
From the west side of the Columbia Turnpike, the sights of the artillery fire smashing into A.P. Stewart’s men was unforgettable. Everywhere the sights were incredible, almost breathtaking. Col. Ellison Capers was in the 24th South Carolina west of the pike and his regiment, part of States Rights Gist’s Brigade, was on John Brown’s left flank. Some distance in advance and to the left of the South Carolinians stood magnificent Everbright mansion, home to the widowed Rebecca Bostick. But it was what Col. Capers saw to his right that he never forgot. At Capers and his fellow Palmetto Staters began to crest the rising terrain around Privet Knob, the ground stretching from the Columbia Pike to the Lewisburg Pike opened up into view. Capers wrote that ‘we beheld the magnificent spectacle the battle-field presented – bands were playing, general and staff officers and gallant couriers were riding in front of and between the lines, 100 battle-flags were waving in the smoke of battle, and bursting shells were wreathing the air with great circles of smoke, while 20,000 brave men were marching in perfect order against the foe.’”
Jacobson, For Cause and For Country: p. 278-279.
Important quotes related to the Battle of Franklin:
When we got to the turnpike near Spring Hill, lo! and behold; wonder of wonders! the whole Yankee army had passed during the night. The bird had flown.
- Confederate Private Sam Watkins, 1st Tennessee Infantry
[Hood was] wrathy as a rattlesnake this morning, striking at everything.
- Confederate General John Brown to Maj. Vaulx of Cheatham’s staff, on the disposition of John Bell Hood on the morning of November 30th, upon learning that the Federals had escaped from Spring Hill in the early morning hours and had headed toward Franklin.
I have never seen more intense rage and profound disgust than was expressed by the weary, foot-sore, battle-torn Confederate soldiers when they discovered that their officers had allowed their prey to escape.
- Mississippian Rhett Thomas
The road was strewn everywhere with the wreck of thrown away stuff that they were unable to carry in their flight.
- Confederate Lt. Spencer B. Talley, 28th TN Infantry, describing what he saw along the Columbia Pike as the rebel army followed after the Union army into Franklin
To which Lt. William H. Berryhill, 43rd Miss., (CSA) added, the road was strewn with tents, knapsacks, dirty clothing, books, paper and a great many wagons were on fire.
Burnt wagons, dead pack animals, and tossed knapsacks all seemed to indicate a demoralized retreat, heartening the Southerners with thoughts of possible enemy capitulation and a quick victory.
Patrick Brennan, The Battle of Franklin, North & South magazine, January 2005, Vol. 8., No.1: page 35.
If you prevent Hood from turning your position at Franklin, it should be held; but I do not wish you to risk too much.
- George H. Thomas (c0mmander), to John M. Schofield, regarding how to proceed if an attack was to ensue at Franklin. Contrast this with Hood’s attack at-any-cost approach at Franklin.
I do no think the Federals will stand strong pressure from the front; the show of force they are making is a feint in order to hold me back from a more vigorous pursuit.
- General John Bell Hood to Nathan Bedford Forrest
General Hood, if you give me one strong division of infantry with my cavalry, I will agree to flank the Federals from their works within two hours’ time.
- Nathan Bedford Forrest to his commander Hood. Hood engaged two Corps at Franklin; Stewart’s and Cheathams. He did not even wait for Lee’s Corps or for his artillery to effectively engage in the enusing battle. Had he waited for Lee, he would have had three more divisions and could have supported Forrest in his request.
We will make the fight.
- General John Bell Hood to a subordinate officer after surveying the battlefield from Winstead Hill, just shortly before the battle began.
I hereupon decided, before the enemy would be able to reach his stronghold at Nashville, to make that same afternoon another and final effort to overtake and rout him, and drive him in the Big Harpeth river at Franklin, since I could no longer hope to get between him and Nashville, by reason of the short distance from Franklin to that city, and the advantage which the Federals enjoyed in the possession of the direct road.
- Confederate commander of the Army of Tennessee, General John Bell Hood, quoted from Hood’s memoirs, written long after the battle.
I could easily see all the movements of the Federals and readily trace their line. I saw that they were well fortified and in a strong position. I felt that we would take a desperate chance if we attempted to dislodge them.
- Corps Commander, Major General Benjamin F. Cheatham, upon surveying the battlefield from Winstead Hill, two miles south of the Fedederal’s position in downtown Franklin.
If an assault was to be made by Hood, General Cleburne said it would be a terrible and useless waste of life.
- General Patrick R. Cleburne, Cheatham’s division, who would soon lose is own life during the assault.
General, I will take the works or fall in the effort.
- Patrick Cleburne to General John Bell Hood. leburne would fall, mortally wounded in attempting to take the works.
It was the grandest sight I ever saw when our army marched over the hill and reached the open field base. Each division unfolded itself into a single line of battle with as much steadiness as if forming for dress parade. . . The men wer etired, hungry, footsore, ragged, and many of them barefooted, but their spirit was admirable.
- James D. Porter, who served on Benjamin F. Cheatham’s staff.
The rebels had filled the plain to the south, sounding to all like “a tornado heralded by clouds of darkness and muttering thunders.”
I.G. Bennett and William M. Haigh, History of the Thirty-sixth Regiment Illinois Volunteers, 1876, page 644; quoted in Patrick Brennan, The Battle of Franklin, North & South magazine, January 2005, Vol. 8., No.1: page 35.
General Cleburne seemed to be more despondent than I ever saw him. Iwas the last one to receive any instructions from him, and as I saluted and bade him good-bye I remarked, ‘Well General, there will not be many of us that will get back to Arkansas,’ to which he replied, “Well, Govan, if we are to die, let us die like men.”
- Brigadier Daniel C. Govan to Cleburne, and Cleburne’s reply upon commenting just moments before the assault was ordered by Hood.
[Pick back up at page 270 in Jacobson]
We could see them [Confederate Generals on the field at a distance] casting doubting glances in the direction of the formidable foe in our front; and judging from the appearance of their grave and serious looks, we all knew that our commanders in some degree realized the dept of that yawning gulf of destruction which awaited them and us, and which only too soon would engulf us all.
- An unknown Confederate soldier; quoted in Patrick Brennan, The Battle of Franklin, North & South magazine, January 2005, Vol. 8., No.1: page 37.
A profound silence pervaded the entire army; it was simply awful, reminding one of those sickening lulls which precede a tremendous thunderstorm.
- Confederate, John M. Copley, A Sketch of the Battle of Franklin, p. 48.
Go back, and tell them to fight like hell.
- Union General George Wagner instructing the courier to return to Wagner’s men on the frontline, who would take the initial blunt from Hood’s assault.
A tremendous deluge of shot and shell . . . seconded by a murderous sheet of fire and lead from the infantry behind the works, and also another battery of six guns directly in our front. It was, he said, a scene of carnage and destruction fearful to behold.
- A Mississippian survivor who faced the withering fire from Stiles’ brigade on the Union left flank at the opening of the battle.
Great God! Do I command cowards?
- Confederate General William Loring, as he witnessed scores of his Mississippians running for their lives back toward the pike, after facing the initial onslaught of the fire from Casement’s and Stiles’ brigade on the Union left flank.
Never before did a command of the approximate strength of Casement’s in as short a period of time kill and wound as many.
- Union soldier, B.F. Thompson, 112th Illinois, in History; p. 277. Casement’s brigade was made up of 65th and 124th Indian, and the 65th Illinois.
Dam*ed Rebel sons of b_____es . . . . stand here like rocks, and whip the h___ out of them.
- John S. Casement, Union commander of the 2nd brigade
Regarding the violent clash between Opdycke’s men and pockets of Cleburne’s and Brown’s one survivor described the action as the contending elements of hell turned loose (so indelibly stamped that a) long life spent in peaceful pursuits will not suffice to erase or even dim them.
- A survivor of the 73rd Illinois regiment.
With no place to go and no place to hide, the Confederates mounted desperate attacks across the parapet – “as many as thirteen charges” according to one account – and the Federals lining the retrenchment methodically blasted them back. The space between the two gashes in the ground began to resemble a sepulchre, grotesquely lit by little more than gunfure blasts and artillery explosions. And in a particularly gruesome development, the men started building shelters out of the bodies of their comrades. All the while the nearly continuous fire from the gin house coursed through the huddled soldiers, exacting a bloody price with every sweep.
- Quoted in Patrick Brennan, The Battle of Franklin, North & South magazine, January 2005, Vol. 8., No.1: page 43; Regarding the fire General George Gordon’s Confederate troops experienced as they fought in front of the Cotton Gin.
I never saw men put in such a terrible position as Cleburne’s division for a few minutes. The wonder is that any of them escaped death or capture.
- a Federal soldier, quoted in, The Battle of Franklin, M. Foster Farley, Civil War magazine; Summer 2006: p. 58.
Heads, arms, and legs were sticking out in almost every conceivable manner . . . The air was filled with moans of the wounded.
- Capt. John Shellenberger, 50th Ohio, Union soldier.
It was impossible to exaggerate the fierce energy with which the Confederate soldiers that November afternoon threw themsleves against the works, fighting with what seemed the very madness of despair. At some of the earthworks the press of men was so great that the dead having no place to fall, remained in an upright position.
- a Federal soldier, quoted in, The Battle of Franklin, M. Foster Farley, Civil War magazine; Summer 2006: p. 58.
Our loss of officers in the battle of Franklin on the 30th was excessively large in proportion to the loss of our men. The medical director reports a very large proportion of slightly wounded men.
- John Bell Hood, writing two days after the battle to Confederate Secretary of War, James A. Seddon. The South lost 53 of 100 regimental commanders in the field at Franklin. Granbury’s brigade alone lost 70% of their regimental commanders. Undeterred, Hood would unmercilously throw his beleaguered Army of Tennessee against Thomas in another suicidal attack just two weeks later, effectively destroying his army. He would be replaced within weeks of the loss at Nashville, having led the Army of Tennesse for roughly six months.
Confederate Order of Battle, Franklin, TN (November 30, 1864)
Army of Tennessee, General John Bell Hood, commanding
INFANTRY
LEE’s Corps: Leut. Gen. Stephen D. Lee
Johnson’s Division: Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson
Deas’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Zachariah C. Deas
19th, 22d, 25th, 39th, 50th Alabama
Manigault’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Arthur M. Manigault, Lt. Col. William L. Butler (Nashville)
24th, 28th, 34th Alabama; 10th, 19th South CarolinaSharp’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Sharp
7th, 9th, 10th, 41st, 44th Mississippi
9th Battalion Mississippi SharpshootersBrantley’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. William F. Brantley
24th, 27th, 29th, 30th, 34th Mississippi
Dismounted Cavalry Company
Stevenson’s Division: Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson
Cummings’s Brigade: Col. Elihu P. Watkins
24th, 36th, 39th, 56th GeorgiaPettus’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Edmund W. Pettus
20th, 23d, 30th, 31st, 46th Alabama
Clayton’s Division: Maj. Gen. Henry D. Clayton
Stovall’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Marcellus A. Stovall
40th, 41st, 42d, 43d, 52d GeorgiaGibson’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Randall L. Gibson
1st, 4th, 13th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 25th, 30th Louisiana
4th Lousiana Battalion; 14th Lousiana Battalion SharpshootersHoltzclaw’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. James Holtzclaw
18th, 32d, 36th, 38th, 58th Alabama
STEWART’s Corps: Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart
Loring’s Division: Maj. Gen. William W. Loring
Featherston’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Featherston
1st, 3d, 22d, 31st, 33d, 40th Mississippi
1st Mississippi BattalionAdams’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. John Adams; Col. Robert Lowry (Nashville)
6th, 14th, 15th, 20th, 23d, 43d MississippiScott’s Brigade: Brig Gen Thomas M. Scott; Col. John Snodgrass (Nashville)
27th, 35th, 49th, 55th, 57th Alabama; 12th Louisiana
French’s Division: Maj. Gen. Samuel G. French, Brig. Gen. Claudius Sears
Ector’s Brigade: Col. David Coleman
29th, 30th North Carolina, 9th Texas
10th, 14th, 32d Texas Cavalry (dismounted)Cockrell’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. F.M. Cockrell, brigade detached prior to Nashville under Col. Peter C. Flournoy
1st, 2nd, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th Missouri
1st Missouri Cavalry (dismounted)
3d Missouri Cavalry Battalion (dismounted)Sears’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Claudius Sears, Lt. Col. Reuben H. Shotwell (Nashville)
4th, 35th, 36th, 39th, 46th Mississippi
7th Mississippi Battalion
Walthall’s Division: Maj. Gen. Edward C. Walthall
Quarles’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. William A. Quarles; Brig. Gen. George D.
Johnson (Nashville)
1st Alabama; 42d, 46th, 48th, 49th, 53d, 55th TennesseeCantley’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Charles M. Shelley
17th, 26th, 29th Alabama; 37th MississippiReynold’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Daniel H. Reynolds
4th, 9th, 25th Arkansas
1st, 2d Arkansas Mounted Rifles (dismounted)
CHEATHAM’s Corps: Major General Benjamin F. Cheatham
Cleburne’s Division: Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne, Brig. Gen. James A. Smith (Nashville)
Lowrey’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey (Franklin)
16th, 33d, 45th Alabama; 5th, 8th, 32d Mississippi;
3d Mississippi BattalionGovan’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Daniel C. Govan
1st, 2d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 13th, 15th, 19th, 24th
ArkansasGranbury’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Hiram B. Granbury; Capt. E. T. Broughton
5th Confederate; 35th Tennessee; 6th, 7th, 10th, 15th Texas
17th, 18th, 24th, 25th Texas Cavalry (dismounted); Nutt’s Louisana Cavalry (dismounted)Smith’s Brigade: on detached duty before Nashville-
Brig. Gen. James A. Smith; Col. Charles H. Olmstead
(Nashville)
54th, 57th, 63d Georgia; 1st Georgia Volunteers
Brown’s (Cheatham’s Old) Division: Maj. Gen. John C. Brown; Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey (Nashville)
Gist’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. States Rights Gist; Lt. Col. Zachariah L. Watters (Nashville)
46th, 65th Georgia; 2d Battalion Georgia Sharpshooters; 16th, 24th South CarolinaManey’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. John C. Carter; Col. Hume R. Field (Nashville)
1st, 4th (provisional), 6th, 8th, 9th, 16th, 27th, 28th, 50th TennesseeStrahl’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Otho F. Strahl; Col. AndrewJ. Kellar (Nashville)
4th, 5th, 19th, 24th, 31st, 33d, 38th, 41st TennesseeVaughan’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. George W. Gordon; Col. William M. Watkins (Nashville)
11th, 12th, 13th, 29th, 47th, 51st, 52nd, 154th Tennessee
Bate’s Division: Maj. Gen. William B. Bate
Tyler’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Thomas B. Smith
37th Georgia; 4th Battalion Georgia Sharpshooters;
2d, 10th, 20th, 37th TennesseeFinley’s Brigade: Col. Robert Bullock; Maj. Jacob A. Lash
1st, 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th Florida, 1st Florida Cavalry (dismounted)Jackson’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Henry R. Jackson
25th, 29th, 30th Georgia; 1st Georgia Confederate;
1st Battalion Georgia Sharpshooters
Artillery:
LEE’s Corps: 1) Col. Robert F. Beckham 2) Maj. John W. Johnston
Courtney’s Battalion: Capt. James P. Douglas
Dent’s Alabama Battery; Douglas’s Texas Battery; Garrity’s Alabama BatteryEldridge’s Battalion: Capt. Charles E. Fenner
Eufaula Alabama Battery; Fenner’s Louisiana Battery; Stanford’s Miss BatteryJohnson’s Battalion: Capt. John B. Rowan
Corput’s Georgia Battery; Marshall’s Tenn Battery; Stephens’s Light Artillery
STEWART’s Corps: Lt. Col. Samuel C. Williams
Truehart’s Battalion:
Lumsden’s Alabama Battery; Selden’s Alabama BatteryMyrick’s Battalion:
Bouanchaud’s Louisiana Battery; Cowan’s Miss Battery,
Darden’s Miss BatteryStorrs’ Battalion:
Guiborps Missouri Battery; Hoskin’s Miss Battery; Kolb’s Alabama Battery
CHEATHAM’s Corps: Col. Melancthon Smith
Hoxton’s Battalion:
Perry’s Florida Battery; Phelan’s Alabama Battery; Turner’s Miss BatteryHotchkiss’s Battalion:
Bledsoe’s Missouri Battery; Goldtwaite’s Alabama Battery; Key’s Arkansas BatteryCobb’s Battalion:
Ferguson’s South Carolina Battery; Phillip’s [Mabane's]
Cavalry: Maj. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest
CHALMER’s Division: Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers
Rucker’s Brigade: Col. Edmund W. Rucker
7th Alabama Cavalry; 5th Miss Cavalry; 7th, 12th, 14th, 15th Tenn Cavalry; Forrest’s Regiment Tenn CavalryBiffle’s Brigade: Col. Jacob B. Biffle, 10th Tenn Cavalry
BUFORD’s Division: Brig. Gen. Abraham Buford
Bell’s Brigade: Col. Tyree H. Bell
2d, 19th, 20th, 21st Tenn Cavalry; Nixon’s Tenn Cavalry RegimentCrossland’s Brigade: Col. Edward Crossland
3d, 7th, 8th, 12th Kentucky Mounted Infantry;
12th Kentucky Cavalry; Huey’s Kentucky Battalion
JACKSON’s Division: Brig. Gen. William H. Jackson
Armstrong’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Frank C. Armstrong
1st, 2d, 28th Miss Cavalry; Ballentine’s Miss RegimentRoss’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Lawrence S. Ross
5th, 6th, 9th Texas Cavalry; 1st Texas Legion
ARTILLERY
Morton’s Tennesse Battery, Slocumb’s Louisiana Battery
Maj.-Gen. B. F. Cheatham.
“On the morning of the 4th of December,” says General Cheatham, “I went to the headquarters of Gen
eral Hood, and referring to his note and the criticism that had evidently been made by some one, I said to him, ‘A great opportunity was lost at Spring Hill, but you know that I obeyed your orders there, as everywhere, literally and promptly.’ General Hood not only did not dissent from what I said, but exhibited the most cordial manner, coupled with confidence and friendship.”
At daylight Cheatham’s corps passed through the village of Spring Hill, and between 1 and 2 o’clock p.m. the army reached the vicinity of Franklin, and Stewart’s and Cheatham’s corps were put in positions. The enemy was heavily intrenched and was superior in numbers and equipment. On the morning of the battle, General Schofield, commanding the Federal army, had behind his works 23,734 infantry and artillery, and his cavalry numbered 5,500. Maj.-Gen. J. D. Cox, U. S. A., upon whose authority these figures are given, states in his history of the battle of Franklin that Hood delivered the assault on the Federal lines with “two or three hundred less than 24,000″ men, and gives Forrest’s strength at 9,000. Maj.-Gen. John C. Brown reported that on the morning of November 29, 1864, he had not exceeding 2,750 men in his division, the largest in Cheatham’s corps, and the three divisions did not exceed 6,000. Smith’s brigade of Cleburne’s division was not present. Stewart’s corps after Allatoona was less than 7,000, and with Johnson’s division of Lee’s corps, the assaulting column did not exceed 16,000 men. General Forrest stated in his official report that the entire cavalry force under his command was about 5,000.
Bate’s division was on the left, Brown’s in the center, Cleburne’s on the right. General Bate says his line “charged the works of the enemy. 
My right got to the works (the second line) and remained there until morning;’the left was driven back. The enemy’s works were strong and defiant, constructed on a slight elevation, with few obstructions in front for several hundred yards. The works to the left of Carter’s creek turnpike were not strong, and with a vigorous assault should have been carried; a fact, however, not known until next day.” Bate’s division sustained a loss of 47 killed and 253 wounded. Capt. Todd Carter (right), on staff duty with Smith’s Tennessee brigade, fell mortally wounded near the enemy’s works and almost at the door of his father’s house.
No more magnificent spectacle was ever witnessed than the advance of the two divisions commanded by Cleburne and Brown; no two divisions of the army were ever led with greater skill and gallantry; no generals of division were ever supported with better ability by brigade, regimental and company officers. The troops were veterans who had never failed to respond to orders, although discouraged by recent and frequent disasters; and fully alive to the desperation of the assault about to be made, they advanced with noble courage. Before troops of equal numbers in the open field they would have been irresistible, but to attack intrenched troops, superior in numbers, advancing over an open plain without cover, was a disregard of the rules of war, a waste of precious lives, and a wrecking of an army once the pride and hope of the Southwest.
Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
Memphis, Tenn.,
May 20, 1877.
Maj.-Gen. John C. Brown, commanding Cheatham’s division, gave the following account of the same affair:
My division comprised four brigades of infantry, commanded respectively by Gen. S. R. Gist, of South Carolina, Gens. O. F. Strahl, O. W. Gordon and John C. Carter, of Tennessee. The whole command on the morning of November 29, 1864, when I left my bivouac on the Mooresville turnpike in front of Columbia, Tenn., numbered not exceeding 2,750 effective men. Gist’s brigade was the largest and Strahl’s was next in numerical strength, those of Gordon and Carter being about equal in the number of effective men. We started on the march about sunrise, and after traversing cedar brakes and pathless woods, crossed Duck river by a pontoon previously laid, about four miles above Columbia, at or near what was known as Davis’ ferry or Davis’ ford. Conforming to the daily alternations, my division was the rear of your (Cheatham’s) corps. After crossing Duck river, as I now recollect, at or near Bear creek, the commanding general, apprehending an attack on our left flank, ordered your corps, in its march from that point, to move in two parallel columns, so that it could come instantly into action in two lines of battle if attacked on the flank. Accordingly, my division was ordered to form the supporting column, and for that purpose to leave the road by which the main body was moving, and so conform its movements to that of the other two divisions (Cleburne’s and Bate’s), that in coming into action to meet an attack on our left flank, it would occupy a place in rear of and about 400 yards distant from the front line of battle. The march thence to Rutherford’s creek was made pursuant to these orders, and the whole distance thus traversed (five or six miles) was through fields and woods and over rough ground, adding greatly to the fatigues of the day. About the commencement of this movement, or soon afterward, by the orders of the commanding general in person, the whole of Gist’s and about one-half of Strahl’s brigade were detached for picket duty, to be relieved by the orders of the commanding general, thus leaving me with about one-half of my division.
When near Rutherford’s creek, learning that a crossing was not practicable east of the road, I changed the direction of the march to the left into the road and found Bate’s division preparing to cross the stream. After reaching the north bank of the stream, I was ordered to pursue the road leading in the direction of the Caldwell place, while Cleburne’s and Bate’s divisions moved at an angle to the left; but before reaching the Dr. Caldwell house, I was ordered to change the direction of my column to the left, and we reached the “Lewisburg,” or “Rally Hill” pike, near the toll-gate, a distance of one and a half mile from Spring Hill. This was within an hour or an hour and a half of sunset. I could distinctly see the enemy in force, both infantry and artillery, at Spring Hill, but did not, and perhaps could not at that point, see either troops or wagons, moving on the Columbia pike. Forrest’s cavalry were on higher ground northeast of my position. I was ordered to form line of battle and “take” Spring Hill. Gist’s brigade and the detachment from Strahl had not reported. I formed my line as speedily as worn troops could move, and after throwing forward a skirmish line, advanced 400 or 500 yards, when I discovered a line of the enemy thrown out of Spring Hill, across and threatening my right flank, and I then discovered for the first time that General Forrest’s cavalry, which I had been assured would protect my right, had been ordered to another part of the field, leaving me without any protection on my right flank or support in rear. I had neither artillery nor cavalry, and was left in a position where I must meet with inevitable disaster if I advanced on Spring Hill. A hasty consultation with my brigade commanders resulted in a determination to suspend the advance and confer with the corps commander. I need not remind you that in a very few minutes you were upon the field and fully approved of what had been done, as did also General Hood a little later, when he directed that the attack should be delayed until the arrival of Generals Stewart and Gist, and in the meanwhile, that the whole command should be held under orders to advance at a moment’s notice. General Gist’s brigade reported a little after nightfall and was immediately placed in position on my right. General Stewart’s corps came up later and went into bivouac on the stream in rear of my right, where it remained until the following morning. I received no further orders that evening or during the night to advance or change my position. After daylight on the morning of the 30th I took up the line of march for Franklin, the enemy in the meantime having preceded us under circumstances of which you are fully advised.
On the march to Franklin, General Cleburne, with whom I had long enjoyed very close personal relations, sent a message to the head of my column requesting an interview. Allowing my column to pass on, I awaited his arrival. When he came up we rode apart from the column through the fields, and he told me with much feeling that he had heard that the commanding general was endeavoring to place upon him the responsibility of allowing the enemy to pass our position on the night previous. I replied to him that I had heard nothing on that subject and that I hoped he was mistaken. He said, “No, I think not; my information comes through a very reliable channel,” and said that he could not afford to rest under such an imputation, and should certainly have the matter investigated to the fullest extent, as soon as we were away from the immediate presence of the enemy. General Cleburne was quite angry and evidently was deeply hurt, under the conviction that the com-mander-in-chief had censured him. I asked General Cleburne who was responsible for the escape of the enemy during the afternoon and night previous. In reply to that inquiry he indulged in some criticisms of a command (Bate’s division) occupying a position on his left, and concluded by saying that of course the responsibility rests with the commander-in-chief, as he was upon the field during the afternoon and was fully advised during the night of the movement of the enemy. The conversation at this point was abruptly terminated by the arrival of orders from yourself or the commanding general. As he left he said, “We will resume this conversation at the first convenient moment,” but in less than three hours after that time this gallant soldier was a corpse upon the bloody field of Franklin.
Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
Also see:
- Wikipedia article on John C. Brown
Major-General Cheatham gave the following account of the affair at Spring Hill:
In pursuance of orders from army headquarters, my command crossed Duck river on the morning of the 29th of November, 1864, the division of Major-General Cleburne in advance, followed by that of Major-General Bate, the division of Major-General Brown in the rear. The march was made as rapidly as the condition of the road would allow and without occurrence of note, until about 3 o’clock p.m., when I arrived at Rutherford’s creek, two and one-half miles from Spring Hill. At this point General Hood gave me verbal orders as follows: That I should get Cleburne across the creek and send him forward toward Spring Hill, with instructions to communicate with General Forrest, who was near the village, ascertain from him the position of the enemy, and attack immediately; that I should remain at the creek, assist General Bate in crossing his division, and then go forward and put Bate’s command in to support Cleburne, and that he would push Brown forward to join me.
As soon as the division of General Bate had crossed the creek I rode forward, and at a point on the road, about one and a half mile from Spring Hill, I saw the left of Cleburne’s command just disappearing over the hill to the left of the road. Halting there, I waited a few minutes for the arrival of Bate, and formed his command with his right upon the position of Cleburne’s left, and ordered him forward to the support of Cleburne. Shortly after Bate’s division had disappeared over the same range of hills, I heard firing toward Cleburne’s right and just then General Brown’s division had come up. I thereupon ordered Brown to proceed to the right, turn the range of hills over which Cleburne and Bate had crossed, and form line of battle and attack to the right of Cleburne. The division of General Brown was in motion to execute this order when I received a message from Cleburne that his right brigade had been struck in flank by the enemy and had suffered severely, and that he had been compelled to fall back and reform his division with a change of front.
It so happened that the direction of Cleburne’s advance was such as had exposed his right flank to the enemy’s line. 
When his command was formed on the road by which he had marched from Rutherford’s creek, neither the village of Spring Hill nor the turnpike could be seen. Instead of advancing directly upon Spring Hill, his forward movement was a little south of west and almost parallel with the turnpike toward Columbia, instead of northwest upon the enemy’s lines, south and east of the village. A reference to the map will show Cleburne’s line of advance. General Cleburne was killed in the assault upon Franklin the next day, and I had no opportunity to learn from him how it was that the error of direction occurred.
Meanwhile General Bate, whom I had placed in position on the left of Cleburne’s line of march, continued to move forward in the same direction until he had reached the farm of N. F. Cheairs, one and a half mile south of Spring Hill.
After Brown had reached the position indicated to him and had formed a line of battle, he sent to inform me that it would be certain disaster for him to attack, as the enemy’s line extended beyond his right several hundred yards. I sent word to him to throw back his right brigade and make the attack. I had already sent couriers after General Bate to bring him back and direct him to join Cleburne’s left. Going to the right of my line I found Generals Brown and Cleburne, and the latter reported that he had reformed his division. I then gave orders to Brown and Cleburne that as soon as they could connect their lines they should attack the enemy, who were then in sight; informing them at the same time that General Hood had just told me that Stewart’s column was close at hand, and that General Stewart had been ordered to go to my right and place his command across the pike. I furthermore said to them that I would go myself and see that General Bate was placed in position to connect with them, and immediately rode to the left of my line for that purpose.
During all this time I had met and talked with General Hood repeatedly, our field headquarters being not over 100 yards apart. After Cleburne’s repulse I had been along my line and had seen that Brown’s right was outflanked several hundred yards. I had urged General Hood to hurry up Stewart and place him on my right, and had received from him the assurance that this would be done; and this assurance, as before stated, I had communicated to Generals Cleburne and Brown.
When I returned from my left, where I had been to get Bate in position, and was on the way to the right of my line, it was dark; but I intended to move forward with Cleburne and Brown and make the attack, knowing that Bate would be in position to support them. Stewart’s column had already passed by on the way toward the turnpike, and I presumed he would be in position on my right.
On reaching the road where General Hood’s field quarters had been established, I found a courier with a message from General Hood requesting me to come to him at Captain Thompson’s house, about one and a fourth miles back on the road to Rutherford’s creek. I found General Stewart and General Hood. The commanding general there informed me that he had concluded to wait till morning, and directed me to hold my command in readiness to attack at daylight.
I was never more astonished than when General Hood informed me that he had concluded to postpone the attack till daylight. The road was still open–orders to remain quiet until morning–and nothing to prevent the enemy from marching to Franklin.
Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X
Following the evacuation of Atlanta, Confederate General John Bell Hood formulated an elaborate plan to draw General William T. Sherman away from that city and place his own army in position to recapture Middle Tennessee. Hood planned to march his army north, capture the vital Union supply depot of Nashville, and take the war into Kentucky and Ohio.
Initially Hood’s plan worked. Sherman withdrew from Atlanta and followed the Army of Tennessee into North Georgia. There, Sherman realized the numerical superiority of his forces and detached a portion of his army to stay ahead of Hood’s advance north, while he returned with the main force to implement his March to the Sea. General John Schofield, Hood’s West Point classmate, was placed in command of the Fourth and Twenty-third Army Corps and given the task of slowing the Confederate advance to Nashville.
On the afternoon of November 29, 1864, the Army of Tennessee managed to get between Schofield’s command and the federal stronghold at Nashville at the town of Spring Hill. When the Confederate forces failed to cut the road north, the Union troops marched by their enemy in the middle of the night. By the next morning, they had entered Franklin and occupied a series of earthen fortifications on the southern edge of town. During the day, Union soldiers strengthened their already formidable position as Schofield made plans to evacuate Franklin and march to Nashville.
When Hood awoke on November 30 and found that the Union army had escaped, he blamed everyone but himself for the missed opportunity and immediately marched the Army of Tennessee to Franklin. Arriving at Winstead Hill (two miles south of Franklin), Hood determined to make a fight despite the warnings from Generals Nathan Bedford Forrest and Benjamin Cheatham to avoid a frontal assault. The Confederate commander accepted no counsel and ordered his subordinates to prepare for the assault.
Cannon sitting on present-day Winstead Hill, facing north toward downtown Franklin.
At 4:30 in the afternoon, as the sun began to set, the Army of Tennessee stepped off in a three-mile-long battle line to launch the last grand charge of the war in Tennessee. Marching forward in near-parade formation, the leading elements of the Confederate line overwhelmed the advanced Union position one-half mile in front of the main line. Chasing the fleeing Federals, the men of Generals Patrick Cleburne’s and John C. Brown’s divisions smashed into the Union earthworks along the Columbia Pike. Driving the Federals through the front and back yard of Fountain B. Carter’s house and into the front yard of Albert Lotz’s home, the advancing Confederates met a counter charge by Colonel Emerson Opdycke’s brigade. In fierce hand-to-hand fighting, the Federal soldiers forced the Confederates back to the outer ditch of the main earthworks.
Present-day view of Albert Lotz house, adjacent (east) of the farm belonging to F.B. Carter. The Lotz house sits right on the east side of Columbia Pike.
The Confederates made as many as eighteen separate charges but failed to make a significant breach in the Union defenses. Some Confederate attacks occurred so late at night that the soldiers used torches to guide their lines forward. The fight lasted until ten o’clock, leaving Union troops inside the works and Confederates in the outer ditches only a few feet apart. Many soldiers sat with their backs against the works and held their muskets over their heads to fire them into the opposing ranks.
After five hours of bloodletting, the small arms fire died away. Schofield wasted no time pulling his men out of their positions and marching them toward Nashville. That night, as the temperature dropped, the wounded Union and Confederate soldiers left on the field suffered terribly. The dead and dying lay in heaps sometimes five or six deep in the outer ditch. Field hospitals in the Carter and Lotz houses and the Carnton Mansion, treated the seemingly endless stream of wounded.
The battle exacted a disastrous toll on the Confederate forces. Hood sent approximately 23,000 soldiers against a fortified line protected by 15,000 Union soldiers and incurred 7,000 casualties, while the Federals lost approximately 2,500. Of the one hundred Confederate regimental commanders, sixty-three were killed or wounded. The casualty toll among Confederate generals was also high–six killed, five wounded, and one captured. As the Army of Tennessee moved north toward Nashville, a colonel commanded General John C. Brown’s division, and a captain led General Hiram Granbury’s brigade. At the battle of Nashville, two weeks later, the Army of Tennessee was not effective, having left a sizable number of hardened veterans and officers on the field of Franklin.
Source citation: The Tennessee Encyclopedia of History and Culture (online)
Description of the Battle (Wikipedia, 12/3/06)
Hood’s attack initially enveloped Wagner’s forward brigades, which fled back to the main breastworks. Blue and Gray troops were intermingled, which made the Union soldiers defending the line reluctant to fire on the approaching masses. This caused a weak spot in the Union line at the Carter House as an inexperienced regiment, just arrived from Nashville, broke and fled with Wagner’s troops. The Confederate divisions of Maj. Gens. Patrick Cleburne, John C. Brown, and Samuel G. French converged on this spot. An heroic counterattack by the brigade of Emerson Opdycke and two of Cox’s regiments sealed the gap after thirty minutes of fierce hand-to-hand combat.
Over and over the Confederates smashed headlong and futilely into the Union line. Just before dark, the division of Maj. Gen. Edward “Allegheny” Johnson arrived and it had no more luck than its predecessors. By 9:00 p.m. the fighting subsided. The overall attack had been awesome, described by some as a tidal wave, and known as the “Pickett’s Charge of the West.” But it was actually much larger than the famous charge at Gettysburg. In the East, 12,500 Confederates crossed a mile of open ground in a single assault that lasted about 50 minutes. In Franklin, some 20,000 marched into the guns across two miles and conducted seventeen distinct assaults lasting over five hours.
Across the river to the east, Confederate cavalry commander Nathan Bedford Forrest attempted to turn the Union left flank, but the Union cavalry under Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson repulsed his advance.
Schofield, who spent the battle in Fort Granger (just across the Harpeth River, northeast of Franklin), ordered an overnight withdrawal to Nashville, starting at 11:00 p.m. Although there was a period in which the Union army was vulnerable, straddling the river, Hood was too stunned to take advantage of it. The Union army reached the breastworks at Nashville on December 1.
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