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I understand I’m treading on thin ice here with some folk when it comes to critiquing John Bell Hood, especially for his actions at Franklin. So let me clearly state my biases because we all have them; I’m just honest enough to admit them.
My biases and background?
- I was born in Kentucky, which was neutral in the Civil War officially.
- Until ten years ago (late 30s), I was very ‘pro-Southern’ and totally leaned to the so-called States’ rights side of the aisle. I espoused the Lost Cause ideology with conviction then, though I was not even aware how much I had descended into it.
- Today, I have completely shed the Neo-Confederate mindset and its accompanying arguments.
- I now believe that the American Civil War, at least for the last two years, was mostly (but not entirely) fought over the issue of slavery.
- I believe that human slavery was a moral scourge on this nation and wished it would have been effaced from our landscape without the shedding of blood.
If you still have an objective bone in your body I submit the following six items as evidence that John Bell Hood made at least six fatal errors at Franklin. These six are mainly related to his direct frontal massed assault at Franklin.
Hood’s blunder-failure (i.e., his frontal assault) at Franklin can be summed up thus:
a. His assault had virtually zero artillery support.
b. He had too large an army to perform an assault that only had roughly 1.7 miles of width-to-width from flanks once the works were reached. His columns were terribly constrained and inter-mixed.
c. He went against the better judgment of his subordinate commanding generals.
d. His cavalry played virtually no role in the assault strategically.
e. He started the assault too late in the day.
f. He apparently had very little true knowledge of the topography of Franklin, and/or had the knowledge and ignored it.
John Bell Hood
a. His massed assault had virtually zero artillery support.
b. He had too large an army to perform an assault that only had roughly 1.7 miles of width-to-width from flanks once the works were reached. His columns were terribly constrained and inter-mixed.
c. He went against the better judgment of his top subordinate commanding generals.
d. His cavalry played virtually no role in the assault strategically.
e. He started the assault too late in the day. By the time his men reached the works it was nearly dark.
f. He apparently had very little true knowledge of the topography of Franklin, and/or if he had the knowledge, he ignored it.
I’d love to know your opinion. Please comment.
However, I will NOT approve any comment that descends into plain silliness and ad hominem attacks. I revealed my biases so fair-play suggests you will too , then lay out your arguments.
Let the readers make up their own minds.
By the way, don’t forget the Hood Legacy Discussion at Carnton coming November 6th.
Carnton will host a Hood panel discussion on Friday, November 6 at 6 p.m. in the event room of the Fleming Center. It is FREE to the public and will last about 1 ½ hours. Panelists will include Eric A. Jacobson (author, historian), Sam Hood (Hood expert, descendant), Sam Elliot (author, historian) and Brandon Beck (University of Mississippi).
Raleigh, North Carolina
April 20, 1865,
Nov. the 28th
We was ordered to Nashville to defend the place against Rebel [John Bell] Hood. December 1 we got there and dug trenches 2 days and 1 night.
Dec. the 4th & 5th
considerable skirmishing.
The 6 & 7
considerable firing on picket with a little fight. We lost several….
The 15th
Thomas went for them and it was a hard fight with a loss to the Rebs of 12 hundred prisoners 18 pieces of cannon 8 battle flags which we got.
The 16th
the fight gets harder our loss 1000 killed and wounded. Rebs loss 600 hundred killed & wounded. We captured 5000 prisoners 30 canon and several battle flags.
The 17th
Hood has left our front and skedaddled. Thomas after him.
The 19th we was ordered to move we marched to Murfreesboro 2 days….went 9 miles the other side of Huntsville, Alabama the track being torn up. We had to march the rest of the way.
The 27th
we crossed the Tenn. River on transports and run the rebs out of Decatur . Our cavalry captured 4 canon then we started after Hoods pontoon train but hearing that he had made a crossing below we lay at Cortland a few days.
We recently asked Dr. Woodworth this question: Did Hood’s Tennessee Campaign ever have a chance?
With Lincoln’s reelection, the North had demonstrated that it had the will to continue the war, if necessary, for another four years. Can anyone imagine that the Confederacy could possibly have resisted that long? Or, to put it another way, what would have had to happen, after Lincoln’s reelection, for the Confederacy to win its independence? Can we come up with any plausible scenario in which Hood’s Tennessee campaign could have started a chain of events leading to Confederate independence? If Hood had trapped and annihilated Schofield at Spring Hill, it certainly would have been an unwelcome development for the Union, but would it have enabled Hood to defeat Thomas in the fortifications of Nashville? I can’t imagine that it would have. What if Hood had pressed on into Kentucky or even Ohio? Would Union morale have collapsed, prompting Lincoln to sue for peace? Again, I can’t imagine such a reaction. And how might Hood’s ill-clad troops have fared in Ohio in December?
Here are some other posts on the CWG related to Professor Woodworth.
Check out the books on Amazon Dr. Woodworth has authored.
Sam’s Great Granddaughter to speak at December 14th Franklin Civil War Round Table meeting.
Ken Burns, known for his famous PBS historical series, said the “only thing better than Sam Watkins (author of Company Aytch) is more Sam Watkins”. The Franklin Civil War Roundtable is proud to present Ruth Hill McAllister, Sam’s great granddaughter, at our December 14th meeting. She will discuss how she found some of Sam’s original notes and finished her own edition of his famous book. Company Aytch is a first hand account of Sam Watkins as he fought with the Army of Tennessee. His folksy, birds eye view of the common soldier’s life has endured as a popular Civil War masterpiece since it was first published in 1882.
McAllister will share with us family stories of Sam and the events that led her to Watkin’s once lost notes. Come prepared to pick up a copy of this classic work’s latest edition.
Plan to join us December 14, three PM at the Williamson County Public Library.
Dr. Chris Lossom, an author and teacher, ponders the effect the defeat at Franklin (30 Nov 1864) had on the Confederate Army of Tennessee at the Battle of Nashville, two weeks later.
This is an excerpt from a lecture Dr. Lossom gave at the June 2008 Franklin’s Charge symposium in Franklin, TN
Dr. Chris Losson, an author and teacher, explains how the Franklin action was a continuation of the Atlanta Campaign. This is an excerpt from a lecture Dr. Losson gave at the June 2008 Franklin’s Charge symposium in Franklin, TN. Listen why.
Video credit: 2008 Franklin’s Charge symposium
More: Was the potential of a Confederate capture of Nashville in 1864 likely?
Professor Steven Woodworth tackles that question.
Here is the layout of the McGavock Confederate Cemetery.
Lt. Gen. A.P. Stewart’s Corp
Loring’s Division: Maj. Gen. William W. Loring – 126
Scott’s Brigade: Brig Gen Thomas M. Scott – 15
27th Alabama – 4
35th Alabama – 2
49th Alabama – 0
55th Alabama – 3
57th Alabama – 2
12th Louisiana – 4
Featherston’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Featherston – 68
1st Mississippi – 6
3d Mississippi – 14
22d Mississippi – 8
31st Mississippi – 21
33d Mississippi – 10
40th Mississippi – 9
1st Mississippi Battalion – 0
Adams’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. John Adams – 43
6th Mississippi – 3
14th Mississippi – 10
15th Mississippi – 15
20th Mississippi – 10
23d Mississippi – 2
43d Mississippi – 3
Maj. Gen Edward C. Walthall’s Division – 90
Reynold’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Daniel H. Reynolds – 16
4th Arkansas – 1
9th Arkansas – 8
25th Arkansas – 0
1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles (dismounted) – 2
2d Arkansas Mounted Rifles (dismounted) – 3
Cantley’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Charles M. Shelley – 17
17th Alabama – 9
26th Alabama – 0
29th Alabama – 7
37th Mississippi – 1
Quarles’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. William A. Quarles – 57
Staff Officers – 1
1st Alabama – 19
42d Tennessee – 13
46th Tennessee – 6
48th Tennessee – not present at Franklin
49th Tennessee – 9
53d Tennessee – 2
55th Tennessee – 7
French’s Division: Maj. Gen. Samuel G. French – 117
Cockrell’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. F.M. Cockrell – 82
1st Missouri – 8
2nd Missouri – 13
3d Missouri – 15
4th Missouri – 5
5th Missouri – 12
6th Missouri – 7
1st Missouri Cavalry (dismounted) – 12
3d Missouri Cavalry Battalion (dismounted) – 10
Sears’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Claudius Sears – 34
4th Mississippi – 20
35th Mississippi – 4
36th Mississippi – 1
39th Mississippi – 7
46th Mississippi – 0
7th Mississippi Battalion – 2
Ector’s Brigade: Col. David Coleman – 1
39th North Carolina – 1
Ector’s also had the following regiments but they were all detached guarding the pontoon bridge and thus were not ‘engaged’ in the battle itself.
29th North Carolina
30th North Carolina
9th Texas
10th Texas Cavalry (dismounted)
14th Texas Cavarly (dismounted)
32d Texas Cavalry (dismounted)
Kolb’s Alabama Battery – 1
Maj. General Benjamin F. Cheatham’s Corps – 380
Cheatham’s Escort – 1
Cleburne’s Division: Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne – 174
Granbury’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Hiram B. Granbury
5th Confederate – 2
35th Tennessee
6th Texas – 7
7th Texas – 14
10th Texas – 12
15th Texas Cavalry – 3
17th Texas Cavalry – 0
18th Texas Cavalry – 1
24th Texas Cavalry – 6
25th Texas Cavalry (dismounted) – 4
Nutt’s Louisana Cavalry (dismounted)
Govan’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Daniel C. Govan
3d Confederate – 0
1st Arkansas – 9
2d Arkansas – 4
5th Arkansas – 2
6th Arkansas – 15
7th Arkansas – 8
8th Arkansas – 4
13th Arkansas – 0
15th Arkansas – 0
19th Arkansas – 1
24th Arkansas – 0
Lowrey’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey (Franklin)
3d Mississippi Battalion – 8
5th Mississippi – 19
8th Mississippi – 26
32d Mississippi – 11
16th Alabama – 6
33d Alabama – 8
45th Alabama – 4
Brown’s (Cheatham’s Old) Division: Maj. Gen. John C. Brown – 177
Gordon’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. George W. Gordon – 51
11th Tennessee – 9
12th Tennessee – 5
13th Tennessee – 5
29th Tennessee – 13
47th Tennessee – 8
51st Tennessee – 9
52nd Tennessee – 0
154th Tennessee -2
Gist’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. States Rights Gist – 55
2d Battalion Georgia Sharpshooters – 0
8th Georgia Battalion – 5
46th Georgia – 9
65th Georgia – 4
16th South Carolina – 22
24th South Carolina – 15
Strahl’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Otho F. Strahl – 29
4th Tennessee – 8
5th Tennessee – 3
19th Tennessee – 6
24th Tennessee – 1
31st Tennessee – 5
33d Tennessee – 0
38th Tennessee – 3
41st Tennessee – 3
Carter’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. John C. Carter- 42
1st Tennessee – 1
4th Tennessee (provisional) – 0
6th Tennessee – 3
8th Tennessee – 6
9th Tennessee – 5
16th Tennessee – 13
27th Tennessee – 0
28th Tennessee – 5
50th Tennessee – 9
Bate’s Division: Maj. Gen. William B. Bate – 28
Staff Officers – 1
Jackson’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Henry R. Jackson – 14
1st Confederate – 5
1st Battalion Georgia Sharpshooters – 0
25th Georgia – 2
29th Georgia – 6
30th Georgia – 1
66th Georgia – 0
Smith’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Thomas B. Smith – 10
2d Tennessee – 1
10th Tennessee – 0
20th Tennessee – 1
37th Tennessee – 1
37th Georgia – 6
4th Battalion Georgia Sharpshooters – 1
Finley’s Brigade: Jesse J. Finley – 3
1st Florida – 1
3d Florida – 0
4th Florida – 0
6th Florida – 0
7th Florida – 2
1st Florida Cavalry (dismounted) – 0
Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee’s Corps – 55
Johnson’s Division: Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson – 52
Manigault’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Arthur M. Manigault – 6
24th Alabama – 0
28th Alabama – 0
34th Alabama – 1
10th South Carolina – 3
19th South Carolina – 2
Deas’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Zachariah C. Deas – 4
19th Alabama – 1
22d Alabama – 0
25th Alabama – 0
39th Alabama – 2
26th/50th Alabama
Brantley’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. William F. Brantley – 19
24th Mississippi – 6
27th Mississippi – 3
29th Mississippi – 2
30th Mississippi – 8
34th Mississippi – 0
Sharp’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Sharp – 23
7th Mississippi – 2
9th Mississippi – 2
10th Mississippi – 10
41st Mississippi – 8
44th Mississippi – 1
9th Battalion Mississippi Sharpshooters – 0
Clayton’s Division: Maj. Gen. Henry D. Clayton – 2
Gibson’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Randall L. Gibson – 2
1st Louisiana
4th Louisiana
13th Louisiana – 1
16th Louisiana
19th Louisiana – 1
20th Louisiana
25th Louisiana
30th Louisiana
4th Lousiana Battalion
14th Lousiana Battalion Sharpshooters
Stovall’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Marcellus A. Stovall
40th, 41st, 42d, 43d, 52d Georgia
Holtzclaw’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. James Holtzclaw
18th, 32d, 36th, 38th, 58th Alabama
Standford’s Mississippi Battery
Ma.j. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest’s Cavalry Corps 11
CHALMER’s Division: Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers – 2
Rucker’s Brigade: Col. Edmund W. Rucker – 1
7th Alabama Cavalry
5th Miss Cavalry
7th Tenn Cavalry
12th Tenn Cavalry
14th Tenn Cavalry
15th Tenn Cavalry – 1 Cavalry
Forrest’s Regiment Tenn Cavalry
Biffle’s Brigade: Col. Jacob B. Biffle – 1
4th Tenn Cavalry – 1
10th Tenn Cavalry
BUFORD’s Division: Brig. Gen. Abraham Buford – 2
Bell’s Brigade: Col. Tyree H. Bell
2d, 19th, 20th, 21st Tenn Cavalry; Nixon’s Tenn Cavalry Regiment
Crossland’s Brigade: Col. Edward Crossland – 2
3d Kentucky Mounted Infantry – 1
7th Kentucky Mounted Infantry
8th Kentucky Mounted Infantry – 1
12th Kentucky Mounted Infantry
12th Kentucky Cavalry
Huey’s Kentucky Battalion
JACKSON’s Division: Brig. Gen. William H. Jackson – 7
Armstrong’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Frank C. Armstrong – 4
1st Miss Cavalry
2d Miss Cavalry
28th Miss Cavalry – 4
Ballentine’s Miss Regiment
Ross’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. Lawrence S. Ross – 3
3d Texas Cavalry – 3
5th Texas Cavalry
6th Texas Cavalry
9th Texas Cavalry
1st Texas Legion
ARTILLERY
Morton’s Tennessee Battery, Slocumb’s Louisiana Battery
Notes from the Professor: Dr. Steven E. Woodworth. We asked the Professor this question: Was the potential of a Confederate capture of Nashville in 1864 likely in your estimation?
Actually, I think a Confederate capture of Nashville in 1864 was as close to being impossible as almost anything we study in history. The more likely means by which Hood might have achieved greater success would have been by by-passing Nashville and penetrating much farther north–though the season of the year was much against it. And even at that, he wouldn’t have changed the course of the war. If he could, by some miracle, have taken Nashville, that certainly would have been a major headache for the Union high command, but ultimately, with Lincoln having been reelected, the North was committed to waging the war for up to another 4 years if necessary. Lee’s army could not have survived more than a couple of weeks longer than it did, and then Hood’s would have been the only major Confederate army left in the field. Can you imagine him with, say, 30,000 men, besieged in Nashville by perhaps 200,000 or more Union troops, led once again–as had not occurred since Chattanooga–by the combined leadership skills of Grant, Sherman, Thomas, and Sheridan? And with not even the most remote possibility of a Confederate army marching to his relief? In short, the final outcome might have been delayed, and thus attended with even more brutality and destruction, but it would have been the same. The last point in the war at which I can see any remote but semi-realistic hope of Confederate victory was the day before election-day, 1864. And for practical purposes, that election was probably decided on September 1, when Atlanta fell.
Steven E. Woodworth is Professor of History at TCU in Texas.
Among his publications are Jefferson Davis and His Generals (University Press of Kansas, 1990), Davis and Lee at War (University Press of Kansas, 1995), Leadership and Command in the American Civil War (Savas Woodbury, 1996), The American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research (Greenwood, 1996), A Deep Steady Thunder (McWhiney Foundation, 1996), Six Armies in Tennessee (1998), The Musick of the Mocking Birds, The Roar of the Cannon (University of Nebraska Press, 1998), The Art of Command in the Civil War (University of Nebraska Press, 1998), Civil War Generals in Defeat (University Press of Kansas, 1999), This Grand Spectacle (McWhiney Foundation, 1999), Chickamauga: A Battlefield Guide (University of Nebraska Press, 1999), No Band of Brothers (University of Missouri Press, 1999), The Human Tradition in the Civil War and Reconstruction (Scholarly Resources, 2000), Cultures in Conflict (Greenwood, 2000), Grant’s Lieutenants from Cairo to Vicksburg (University Press of Kansas, 2001), While God is Marching On: The Religious World of Civil War Soldiers (University Press of Kansas, 2001), Beneath a Northern Sky: A Short History of the Gettysburg Campaign (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), The Oxford Atlas of the Civil War (Oxford University Press, 2004), Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865 (Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), and Shiloh: A Battlefield Guide (University of Nebraska Press, 2006).
The divisions of Cleburne and Brown made the assault upon the Federal works around 4:30 pm. The shock-attach was so powerful it knocked three Federal regiments on their heels. The Rebels nearly landed a knock-out punch at Franklin. But Emerson Opdycke’s Brigade staunched the flow and saved the day for the Federals. In the assault, Cleburne was shot through the heart.
A historical marker on the site where Cleburne’s assault and death took place honors the fallen Confederate hero. Recently, the Franklin community – through the leadership of Franklin’s Charge – recovered a one-acre piece of ground that was part of the epicenter of this assault. Read about the historic event.
Cleburne’s death was a devastating loss for the Army of Tennessee. The December 3rd edition of The New York Times headlined, “The Rebel General Cleburne Killed.”
Pistol image is used by permission of the Layland Musuem, Cleburne, texas.
I’m sure I’m not the first to think of this question, but, what if Jefferson Davis had promoted Patrick Cleburne to corps command as head of the Army of Tennessee instead of John Bell Hood in July 1864, or even earlier, perhaps even preceding Johnston?
Playing mental ping-pong with what-if-scenarios are highly conjectural, have the advantage of hindsight vision, and can be very unfair to some participants, especially of ones who made big blunders. Well . . . so. It’s still fun.
I postulate this. Had Davis promoted Cleburne instead of Hood to lead the Army of Tennessee, I think the Western theater results might have been very different. Imagine how Cleburne might have approached the Atlanta campaign differently, or especially the Franklin-Nashville campaign.
Though a certain sense of inevitability sets in at some point, meaning, one wonders if anyone on the Confederate side – at the level of Corps commander – would have made any difference having to report to Jefferson Davis, one still wonders what might-have been had someone like Cleburne been able to lead a Corps during the most desperate need for abled-body leadership on behalf of the Confederacy.
If Hood and Cleburne were in the ring together for ten rounds, I score it a knock-out by Cleburne in four!
Ding!
How do you call it?
[Scroll to the very bottom to see comments]
According to historian Eric Jacobson, the Army of Tennessee had 28,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry when it arrived in middle Tennessee in late 1864. Hood took over the Army of Tennessee in July from Johnston. There were 8,000 Federals garrisoned at Nashville at the time.
Hood would lose at least 7,500 at Franklin (30 Nov 1864) and another 6,600 at Nashville, two weeks later. When the Army of Tennessee retreated back to Pulaski in mid December 1864, the army was reduced to but a shadow of its former self.
Confederate General, John Bell Hood
Hood was the fifth commander of the Army of Tennessee. He commanded the army from July 17, 1864, until January 15, 1865. Many historians say his recklessness destroyed the Army of Tennessee. In just six months (July 1864 – December 1864) Hood lost at least 30,000 men* at a time when the Confederate army, and especially the Army of Tennessee, was in desperate need of men.
*Casualty estimates are based on the conservative figures as reported by the National Park Service. Here are the major engagements Hood was involved in from the time he became commander of the Army of Tennessee.
July 20 Peachtree Creek – 4,796
July 22 Atlanta – 8,499
July 28 Ezra Church – 3,000
Aug 31 – Sept 1 Jonesborough – 2,000
Nov 30 Franklin – 6,261
Dec 15 Nashville – 4,462
Carnton historian Eric Jacobson talks about the debacle that was Spring Hill – November 29, 1864 – and how it impacted Patrick Cleburne. What was Cleburne’s possible state of mind just 24 hours before the Battle of Franklin? Jacobson weighs in with some interesting thoughts.
The Federal army, under Schofield, had the huge advantage of Ft. Granger, which sat just south of the Harpeth River, and east of Columbia Pike.
The picture below (click on to enlarge) shows the view from Granger. From the yellow pin designating Ft. Granger one can see Carnton at 12 o’clock (about a mile away), the Carter House at 2 o’clock (about a half mile away), and Winstead Hill at 1 o’clock (about 2 1/2 miles away.
Granger had several large guns in position during the Battle of Franklin. Loring’s and Wathall’s Divisions came from the southwest, crossing Carnton plantation. These Granger guns decimated these divisions from nearly a mile away.
The next map (click to enlarge) shows the Confederate Army of Tennessee as it approached the Federal lines at Franklin. Notice how the Federal position leveraged several geographic features. (1) Using the Harpeth River and the Nashville-Decatur Railroad as a natural barrier for their far left flank. (2) Position of Ft. Granger to protect that left flank. (3) The osage orange abatis also protected the far left flank, making it nearly impossible to penetrate.
Here’s a schematic of the design and layout of Fort Granger.
McGavock Cemetery has nearly 1,500 Confederate soldiers buried on the grounds in front of Carnton. There is no doubt that scores, if not hundreds of them, were casualties resulting from the mass formations and marching the Confederate Army of Tennessee made on open ground, for nearly two miles, as the Rebels came upon the defended Federal line entrenched near downtown Franklin as the battle opened up.
During the Civil War, mass formations, assaulting defended breastworks, often led to mass casualties for the assaulting army. Franklin was no different.
About 4pm on November 30, 1864, C.S.A. General John Bell Hood launched a frontal attack against the Federal troops of the 23rd and 4th Corps of General John M. Schofield. The Confederate Army of Tennessee marched in mass formation across open ground, mostly flat, for nearly two miles before clashing with the Federal line.
On a few battlefields, massed enemy formations could be seen at a considerable distance, at least before the firing began in earnest. Robert G. Carter of the 22nd Massachusetts wrote of the sight of oncoming Confederates on the second day of Gettysburg: “The indistinct form of masses of men, presenting the usual, dirty, greyish, irregular line, were dimly visible and moving up with defiant yells, while here and there the cross-barred Confederate battle flags were plainly to be seen.” Rebel lines also were fully visible at Antietam, Franklin, Bentonville, and a number of other engagements.
The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat. Earl J. Hess, p. 12
View of terrain, looking south, Confederate Army of Tennessee marched across for over one mile at Battle of Franklin
Confederate General John Bell Hood had this basic view of the (then) open ground between Winstead Hill and the entrenched Federal line near Fountain Branch Carter’s property in November 1864. The entire Confederate Army of Tennessee (about 20,000) was positioned here, facing north as in the picture, before they started the quick-step march toward the Federal army (about 22,000).
Original view
Picture credit: Historical Markers of Williamson County, Rick Warwick, p. 174
Contemporary view
Picture credit: author of blog
About 4pm on November 30, 1864, C.S.A. General John Bell Hood launched a frontal attack against the Federal troops of the 23rd and 4th Corps of General John M. Schofield. The Confederate Army of Tennessee marched in mass formation across open ground, mostly flat, for nearly two miles before clashing with the Federal line.
On a few battlefields, massed enemy formations could be seen at a considerable distance, at least before the firing began in earnest. Robert G. Carter of the 22nd Massachusetts wrote of the sight of oncoming Confederates on the second day of Gettysburg: “The indistinct form of masses of men, presenting the usual, dirty, greyish, irregular line, were dimly visible and moving up with defiant yells, while here and there the cross-barred Confederate battle flags were plainly to be seen.” Rebel lines also were fully visible at Antietam, Franklin, Bentonville, and a number of other engagements.
The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat. Earl J. Hess, p. 12
View of terrain, looking south, Confederate Army of Tennessee marched across for over one mile at Battle of Franklin
Confederate General John Bell Hood had this basic view of the (then) open ground between Winstead Hill and the entrenched Federal line near Fountain Branch Carter’s property in November 1864. The entire Confederate Army of Tennessee (about 20,000) was positioned here, facing north as in the picture, before they started the quick-step march toward the Federal army (about 22,000).
Original view
Picture credit: Historical Markers of Williamson County, Rick Warwick, p. 174
Contemporary view
Picture credit: author of blog
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