I understand I’m treading on thin ice here with some folk when it comes to critiquing John Bell Hood, especially for his actions at Franklin. So let me clearly state my biases because we all have them; I’m just honest enough to admit them.
My biases and background?
- I was born in Kentucky, which was neutral in the Civil War officially.
- Until ten years ago (late 30s), I was very ‘pro-Southern’ and totally leaned to the so-called States’ rights side of the aisle. I espoused the Lost Cause ideology with conviction then, though I was not even aware how much I had descended into it.
- Today, I have completely shed the Neo-Confederate mindset and its accompanying arguments.
- I now believe that the American Civil War, at least for the last two years, was mostly (but not entirely) fought over the issue of slavery.
- I believe that human slavery was a moral scourge on this nation and wished it would have been effaced from our landscape without the shedding of blood.
If you still have an objective bone in your body I submit the following six items as evidence that John Bell Hood made at least six fatal errors at Franklin. These six are mainly related to his direct frontal massed assault at Franklin.
Hood’s blunder-failure (i.e., his frontal assault) at Franklin can be summed up thus:
John Bell Hood
a. His massed assault had virtually zero artillery support.
b. He had too large an army to perform an assault that only had roughly 1.7 miles of width-to-width from flanks once the works were reached. His columns were terribly constrained and inter-mixed.
c. He went against the better judgment of his top subordinate commanding generals.
d. His cavalry played virtually no role in the assault strategically.
e. He started the assault too late in the day. By the time his men reached the works it was nearly dark.
f. He apparently had very little true knowledge of the topography of Franklin, and/or if he had the knowledge, he ignored it.
I’d love to know your opinion. Please comment.
However, I will NOT approve any comment that descends into plain silliness and ad hominem attacks. I revealed my biases so fair-play suggests you will too , then lay out your arguments.
Let the readers make up their own minds.
By the way, don’t forget the Hood Legacy Discussion at Carnton coming November 6th.
Carnton will host a Hood panel discussion on Friday, November 6 at 6 p.m. in the event room of the Fleming Center. It is FREE to the public and will last about 1 ½ hours. Panelists will include Eric A. Jacobson (author, historian), Sam Hood (Hood expert, descendant), Sam Elliot (author, historian) and Brandon Beck (University of Mississippi).
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October 26, 2009 at 8:05 pm
Brian Melton
Greetings,
Franklin isn’t my particular specialty, but I do think your comments are pretty solid in general (though I’m open to be disproved). I would make two observations:
1. Re: He went against the better judgment…–I wouldn’t necessarily place emphasis on the fact that he just went against their judgment so much as I might argue that in this case they saw things more clearly than he did. He ought to have seen it because it was true, not just because they brought it up. There are, unfortunately, plenty of cases on record where the commanding general really did know what he was doing, and his subordinates didn’t. So, just because they said something isn’t significant. If you’re not careful, you’ll fall into the Lee-Longstreet at Gettysburg trap. (That could be a post in and of itself.)
2. On slavery as a cause of the war: This is really more directed towards your honest context. I would argue that the best way to conceive of slavery in the war was as its primary “catalyst” as opposed to initial “cause.” There were other direct causes–states rights, tariff issues, etc.–but it was the context of the slavery debate that made them so explosive. For instance, “States Rights” was the explicit “cause” but what state right were they particularly concerned about? After the Emancipation Proclamation, the proverbial cat was out of the bag, and the catalyst merged with the cause, becoming harder to distinguish between.
Just a thought or two.
Best Regards,
Dr. Brian Melton
October 27, 2009 at 3:06 am
tellinghistory
Very good points Dr. Melton. I especially think your slavery point was spot-on. Thanks.
October 26, 2009 at 8:19 pm
Trée
I believe all six points are accurate; however, I think to call them blunders misses somehow what I think you are trying to say. I wish I knew the right word but blunders implies a certain ignorance on Hood’s part or incompetence. Perhaps the phrase “odds against” works, perhaps not. I’m not a fan of “if” this or that so I won’t slip into hypotheticals but I would like to pose the question that always haunts me when I put myself on Winstead Hill and look up that gently sloping march of two miles: What other option(s) did he have?
October 27, 2009 at 4:57 pm
Rob Shenk
Always an interesting topic!
Certainly Hood learned the same lesson that Lee learned at Gettysburg, Grant learned at Cold Harbor, Quincy Gillmore learned at Battery Wagner, and Burnside learned at Fredericksburg – a frontal attack against a well-entrenched foe equipped with rifles and artillery is likely to exact a frightful toll from the attacker.
Curious that this elemental lesson seemed to escape almost every general until World War 2 when new options in mobile warfare presented commanders with opportunities to rapidly envelop static defenses.
Despite the great foolishness of the Confederate assault on November 30, 1864, its remarkable to think that Hood’s army almost did the impossible. Its breakthrough at the center was only pushed back by a fortuitous counter-assault by local Union commanders willing to take the initiative. To me Franklin and Upton’s Assault on the Mule Shoe Salient at Spotsylvania seem so similar in this regard.
My only big “What If” relates to the possibility of Hood engaging in another end round of the Federal forces at Franklin. With the Harpeth in a largely fordable condition, could some significant part of Hood’s army have swung around and cut off the retreating Union army on the north side of the Harpeth? With the Franklin-Harpeth river bridges in a precarious state, could the Union army have responded to this move on November 30? My only counter to this “What If” is that Hood had just tried a similar end-around at Spring Hill and his plan had miscarried. With November daylight hours at a premium, could Hood’s army have rapidly gained the Union rear? We’ll never know.
And what if Hood had decided not to make the attack at Franklin? Great generals seem to have a superior sense of when to attack and when not to attack. Here’s where Hood’s character just seemed predestined to failure on the 1864/1865 battlefield.
October 27, 2009 at 5:43 pm
Darrin Dickey
You’re right about Hood’s failures at Franklin.
I would also throw in that Hood failed to make his attack plan in a rational state. He was furious at the Federal army’s escape from Spring Hill, livid at his own army and probably felt he needed to do something quickly or the blame for the whole thing would come down on him quickly and surely. I also suspect that deep down inside he was most angry at himself as he knew the blame for the whole debacle rested on his shoulders.
It seems like his embarrassment at allowing the Federals to slip away led him to design an attack that was, at least in part, punitive against his own army. To cover his posterior, he needed an action that was immediate and high-energy. I’m sure he thought he could win the fight and punish his army in one shot.
Re: biases & background –
I wouldn’t have guessed that about you. And I’m also coming from a neo-Confederate past myself. But I sympathized with the South’s desire for self-direction and local control. As well as the belief that if a section desired to leave, it had that right.
HOWEVER, I also concur with your belief on the slavery issue. There can be no more central cause (though there were other causes) than that. On the other hand, boiling the whole conflict down to pro-slavery (bad people) vs. anti-slavery (good people), as many folks attempt to do, does great injustice to all sides. The issue was so much more complex than that simplistic and adolescent view. I believe it really devolved into a simple Us vs. Them fight.
In the end, the right side of the slavery issue won. Good riddance to that ugly institution. (And you can lump Jim Crow and racism along with that rubbish).
There! Now you have my two shiny pennies worth of thoughts.
October 28, 2009 at 12:50 pm
John
John Bell Hood lost a leg and an arm and yet fought on for what he believed in and it was not a war based on slavery. It was based on high taxes and states rights. Lincoln wanted the Big money from the South and even told some of the states that they could keep their slaves if they would stay with the union and pay up.
October 28, 2009 at 4:28 pm
tellinghistory
I’m allowing this comment because it reveals your bias, which I appreciate you being honest. But I noticed you did not address any of the points about Hood’s actual failure at Franklin?
October 28, 2009 at 11:32 pm
Sharon
From reading about the Battle of Franklin and having been to and visited parts of the battlefield three times I would concur Hood made a decisive blunder. I think his blunder started at Spring Hill when he allowed Schofield”s troops to march by his encamped troops during the night. He angered and ignored the advise of some of his best subordinates including Cleburne and Forrest. Hood was a good commander when he was under Lee and Longstreet but he was not cut out to be head of an army.
October 29, 2009 at 1:52 pm
Dave DuBrucq
Darren Dicky has summed up my personal analysis of Hood’s state of mind as well as anyone could. Hood was indeed furious with his army for allowing the Federals to slip though unmolested at Spring Hill. Planning in a state of rage, Hood could not have formulated a more ruinous plan of attack.
Against the advice of some of his most capable subordinates, Hood pressed on with a bad plan. The Army of Tennessee suffered catatstrophic losses as a consequence.
As to the causes of the conflict, slavery was chief among them. One need only study the papers of the Southern secession commissioners to understand that conclusion. I am convinced beyond doubt that the letters, papers and speeches of th Southern commissioners of 1860-1861 tell a compelling story about chief cause of secession and the Civil War.
November 3, 2009 at 7:41 am
Grant Hugh Cole
I believe Gen. Hood was a disabled veteran who would have served the South much better in an advisory capacity, especially given the nature and severity of his injuries. Laudanum (tincture of opium) can definitely affect almost anyone’s judgement, and there is good reason to believe that this was the case with Gen. Hood at Franklin, and possibly later at Nashville.
Raised in the Jackson/Lee school of thought and tactics, General Hood was well-versed in the audacious and daring battle strategies of his military idols. At the time of the Franklin debacle, however, whatever inherited good judgement he had displayed in earlier times had long gone by the wayside; whatever was left after Gettysburg, Chickamauga and the Atlanta campaign were undoubtedly and unfortunately obscured by his horrible wounds and the powerful narcotic/sedative he had to take to deal with them.
To paraphrase Shelby Foote, The Flower of the Army of Tennessee fell at the Battle of Franklin. Hood wrecked his own Army in a senseless frontal assault, much too late in the day, and against the advice of men like Generals Cleburne and Forrest. These were barriers to success in addition to the notable preparations for battle manifested by the Union soldiers (with the notable exception of General Wagner). It was too much for any host, especially the hard-driven Army of Tennessee.
A further shame resultant from the loss of valuable men was a complete denial and loss of their influence following the War. Who knows what influential role the fallen soldiers might have played in the rebuilding of their land following the War.
November 3, 2009 at 3:59 pm
historychick
There can be no doubt that Hood accomplished brave and historic acts in other battles which partly resulted to his promotion to lead the Army of Tennessee. I have never fallen into the opiate excuse for his actions as while I’m sure he was in pain, there are no primary sources to promote the dulling of his senses or decision-making abilitites by opiates.
Hood was a good soldier but was arguably not ready to command such a driving force of the Confederacy. He was irrascible and proud, and refused to listen to other generals who had equal or more experience.
By spreading out Forrest’s cavalry, he rendered them nearly useless. And by ignoring the other general’s advice, he sent six fine and fellow soldiers to a wasted and wroughtful death.
Hood’s decisions can never be ignored. His later words damned him even further. Are there reasons Hood chose this path? Sure. But his catastrophic choices are beyond tragic.
This war ended the way it was meant and an unjust and immoral institution was banished. It was only a matter of time, but Hood’s timing. . . may be more tragic still.
November 4, 2009 at 3:44 am
Steven E. Woodworth
There are really two separate issues here. 1) Was the Civil War about slavery? and 2) Did Hood blunder at Franklin? They could be answered independently of each other.
On 1) above, I would say the evidence is completely overwhelming. Read the congressional debates of the 1850s. Observe what was said by the secessionists themselves or by the vice-president of the Confederacy. I can see no other significant issue in the war besides slavery.
On 2), I would once again have to agree. A case can be made in defense of Hood’s battle plans at Atlanta, though not his execution of those plans. Such is not the case at Franklin. It’s true that frontal attacks were sometimes necessary and sometimes successful. It’s also true that every truly great Civil War general launched one or two such attacks that he would no doubt have liked to have taken back afterward but that seemed reasonable when he launched them. Yet there simply can be no palliation or excuse for Hood’s Franklin assault. it did not seem at all reasonable when he launched it. By that point in the war, the simplest drummer boy could see that it could not succeed and would lead to the slaughter of the army. Bad as Hood’s situation was, wrecking his army could only make it worse. His only reasonable option was to maneuver in such a way as to maintain his army, since it was one of the Confederacy’s last assets.
November 5, 2009 at 3:35 pm
Historian-author Wiley Sword weighs in on Hood’s blunder-failure at Franklin «
[...] and author Wiley Sword to see if he’d like to weigh in on the current discussion regarding Hood’s blunder-failure at Franklin. He offered this [...]
November 6, 2009 at 4:27 pm
historychick
Fascinating to have two such learned and accomplished historians weigh in with their opinions.
My response is really a question. Where did this idea come from that Hood was trying to “punish” his men for Spring Hill? It seems idiotic, immature and absolutely counter-productive. Are there any primary sources for this? Or is it mere speculation that has caught fire and spread?