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This map shows the six key Civil War sites being interpreted in the Franklin area. They are all withiun just minutes of each other by a short drive.
- The Town Square
- Fort Granger
- The Carter House/farm
- The Eastern Flank, Battlefield Park
- Carnton
- Winstead Hill
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Eric Jacobson describes A.P. Stewart’s Confederate Corps made up of the Divisions of Loring, Walthall and French, coming across the Eastern flank, across the McGavock farm, as the battle unfolded [Watch now, 1:42]
Read about the dedication of the marker to Loring’s Division on the Eastern flank in June 2008.
We found this YouTube video depicting Tennessee action in the Civil War.
Notes from the Professor: Dr. Steven E. Woodworth. We asked the Professor this question: Was the potential of a Confederate capture of Nashville in 1864 likely in your estimation?
Actually, I think a Confederate capture of Nashville in 1864 was as close to being impossible as almost anything we study in history. The more likely means by which Hood might have achieved greater success would have been by by-passing Nashville and penetrating much farther north–though the season of the year was much against it. And even at that, he wouldn’t have changed the course of the war. If he could, by some miracle, have taken Nashville, that certainly would have been a major headache for the Union high command, but ultimately, with Lincoln having been reelected, the North was committed to waging the war for up to another 4 years if necessary. Lee’s army could not have survived more than a couple of weeks longer than it did, and then Hood’s would have been the only major Confederate army left in the field. Can you imagine him with, say, 30,000 men, besieged in Nashville by perhaps 200,000 or more Union troops, led once again–as had not occurred since Chattanooga–by the combined leadership skills of Grant, Sherman, Thomas, and Sheridan? And with not even the most remote possibility of a Confederate army marching to his relief? In short, the final outcome might have been delayed, and thus attended with even more brutality and destruction, but it would have been the same. The last point in the war at which I can see any remote but semi-realistic hope of Confederate victory was the day before election-day, 1864. And for practical purposes, that election was probably decided on September 1, when Atlanta fell.
Steven E. Woodworth is Professor of History at TCU in Texas.
Among his publications are Jefferson Davis and His Generals (University Press of Kansas, 1990), Davis and Lee at War (University Press of Kansas, 1995), Leadership and Command in the American Civil War (Savas Woodbury, 1996), The American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research (Greenwood, 1996), A Deep Steady Thunder (McWhiney Foundation, 1996), Six Armies in Tennessee (1998), The Musick of the Mocking Birds, The Roar of the Cannon (University of Nebraska Press, 1998), The Art of Command in the Civil War (University of Nebraska Press, 1998), Civil War Generals in Defeat (University Press of Kansas, 1999), This Grand Spectacle (McWhiney Foundation, 1999), Chickamauga: A Battlefield Guide (University of Nebraska Press, 1999), No Band of Brothers (University of Missouri Press, 1999), The Human Tradition in the Civil War and Reconstruction (Scholarly Resources, 2000), Cultures in Conflict (Greenwood, 2000), Grant’s Lieutenants from Cairo to Vicksburg (University Press of Kansas, 2001), While God is Marching On: The Religious World of Civil War Soldiers (University Press of Kansas, 2001), Beneath a Northern Sky: A Short History of the Gettysburg Campaign (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), The Oxford Atlas of the Civil War (Oxford University Press, 2004), Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865 (Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), and Shiloh: A Battlefield Guide (University of Nebraska Press, 2006).
The next day after the battle, December 1st, Patrick Cleburne, and three other Confederate Generals were brought to Carnton and laid out on the back porch. Jacobson eloquently tells the story. What about his Kepi? His pistol?
The bodies of Confederate Generals Cleburne, Adams, Strahl and Granbury were laid out right on this porch on the morning of December 1st, 1864.
This is the authentic Kepi worn by Cleburne the day he was killed.
Image of Cleburne’s Kepi courtesy of the Tennessee State Museum, Nashville, TN.
Want to know more?
Read the incredible true story of what happened to the once-lost pistol that belonged to Patrick Cleburne.
Carnton historian and author Eric Jacobson talks about C.S.A. General Patrick R. Cleburne’s proposal in early 1864 to arm the slaves to fight for the Confederacy. It was very poorly received by the military brass, and probably cost him any further major advancement in rank or position in the Confederate army.
The divisions of Cleburne and Brown made the assault upon the Federal works around 4:30 pm. The shock-attach was so powerful it knocked three Federal regiments on their heels. The Rebels nearly landed a knock-out punch at Franklin. But Emerson Opdycke’s Brigade staunched the flow and saved the day for the Federals. In the assault, Cleburne was shot through the heart.
A historical marker on the site where Cleburne’s assault and death took place honors the fallen Confederate hero. Recently, the Franklin community – through the leadership of Franklin’s Charge – recovered a one-acre piece of ground that was part of the epicenter of this assault. Read about the historic event.
Cleburne’s death was a devastating loss for the Army of Tennessee. The December 3rd edition of The New York Times headlined, “The Rebel General Cleburne Killed.”
Pistol image is used by permission of the Layland Musuem, Cleburne, texas.
I’m sure I’m not the first to think of this question, but, what if Jefferson Davis had promoted Patrick Cleburne to corps command as head of the Army of Tennessee instead of John Bell Hood in July 1864, or even earlier, perhaps even preceding Johnston?
Playing mental ping-pong with what-if-scenarios are highly conjectural, have the advantage of hindsight vision, and can be very unfair to some participants, especially of ones who made big blunders. Well . . . so. It’s still fun.
I postulate this. Had Davis promoted Cleburne instead of Hood to lead the Army of Tennessee, I think the Western theater results might have been very different. Imagine how Cleburne might have approached the Atlanta campaign differently, or especially the Franklin-Nashville campaign.
Though a certain sense of inevitability sets in at some point, meaning, one wonders if anyone on the Confederate side – at the level of Corps commander – would have made any difference having to report to Jefferson Davis, one still wonders what might-have been had someone like Cleburne been able to lead a Corps during the most desperate need for abled-body leadership on behalf of the Confederacy.
If Hood and Cleburne were in the ring together for ten rounds, I score it a knock-out by Cleburne in four!
Ding!
How do you call it?
[Scroll to the very bottom to see comments]
According to historian Eric Jacobson, the Army of Tennessee had 28,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry when it arrived in middle Tennessee in late 1864. Hood took over the Army of Tennessee in July from Johnston. There were 8,000 Federals garrisoned at Nashville at the time.
Hood would lose at least 7,500 at Franklin (30 Nov 1864) and another 6,600 at Nashville, two weeks later. When the Army of Tennessee retreated back to Pulaski in mid December 1864, the army was reduced to but a shadow of its former self.
Confederate General, John Bell Hood
Hood was the fifth commander of the Army of Tennessee. He commanded the army from July 17, 1864, until January 15, 1865. Many historians say his recklessness destroyed the Army of Tennessee. In just six months (July 1864 – December 1864) Hood lost at least 30,000 men* at a time when the Confederate army, and especially the Army of Tennessee, was in desperate need of men.
*Casualty estimates are based on the conservative figures as reported by the National Park Service. Here are the major engagements Hood was involved in from the time he became commander of the Army of Tennessee.
July 20 Peachtree Creek – 4,796
July 22 Atlanta – 8,499
July 28 Ezra Church – 3,000
Aug 31 – Sept 1 Jonesborough – 2,000
Nov 30 Franklin – 6,261
Dec 15 Nashville – 4,462
As the Army of Tennessee approached Franklin on the afternoon of November 30, 1864, John Bell Hood and his commanders met at the Harrison House, just south of Winstead Hill.
Cleburne’s words to his fellow General-colleague, Daniel Govan are now etched into eternity. “Well Govan, if we are to die, let us die like men.”
Carnton historian Eric Jacobson talks about the debacle that was Spring Hill – November 29, 1864 – and how it impacted Patrick Cleburne. What was Cleburne’s possible state of mind just 24 hours before the Battle of Franklin? Jacobson weighs in with some interesting thoughts.
The Federal army, under Schofield, had the huge advantage of Ft. Granger, which sat just south of the Harpeth River, and east of Columbia Pike.
The picture below (click on to enlarge) shows the view from Granger. From the yellow pin designating Ft. Granger one can see Carnton at 12 o’clock (about a mile away), the Carter House at 2 o’clock (about a half mile away), and Winstead Hill at 1 o’clock (about 2 1/2 miles away.
Granger had several large guns in position during the Battle of Franklin. Loring’s and Wathall’s Divisions came from the southwest, crossing Carnton plantation. These Granger guns decimated these divisions from nearly a mile away.
The next map (click to enlarge) shows the Confederate Army of Tennessee as it approached the Federal lines at Franklin. Notice how the Federal position leveraged several geographic features. (1) Using the Harpeth River and the Nashville-Decatur Railroad as a natural barrier for their far left flank. (2) Position of Ft. Granger to protect that left flank. (3) The osage orange abatis also protected the far left flank, making it nearly impossible to penetrate.
Here’s a schematic of the design and layout of Fort Granger.
The new Holt property that was recently purchased by Franklin’s Charge is a strategic cornerstone in being able to properly interpret key action during the Battle of Franklin, especially around the Carter cotton gin area. The following map places the Holt property in its strategic context to the overall layout of the land.
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